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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Es wird im Allgemeinen angenommen, dass verhaltensökonomische Eigenschaften und 
risikobehaftete Managemententscheidungen für die Erklärung chronischer Armut in 
Entwicklungsländern eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Die Literatur besagt, dass Haushalte, die 
in ihrem Einkommen und ihrer Vermögensausstattung begrenzt, und somit anfällig 
gegenüber Schocks sind, mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit dazu neigen, Investitionen mit 
geringem Risiko und geringer Rendite vorzunehmen und damit ihre Chance der Armut zu 
entfliehen, verfehlen. Gleichermaßen ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit gering, dass diese 
Haushalte auf einen Teil ihres gegenwärtigen Konsums verzichten, um diesen in 
langfristige Investitionen anzulegen, die sich erst zu einem zukünftigen Zeitpunkt 
auszahlen und ihre Lebensbedingungen verbessern könnten. Somit sind Risiko- und 
Zeitpräferenzen zwei wichtige verhaltensökonomische Eigenschaften, die risikobehaftete 
Entscheidungen beeinflussen. 
 
Sowohl individuelle Risiko- und Zeitpräferenzen als auch Risikomanagement bilden den 
Kern dieser Arbeit. Ziel ist es, unser Verständnis über den Zusammenhang zwischen 
Präferenzen, Risikomanagement und Armut in Entwicklungsländern anhand von Daten zu 
ökonomischen Feldexperimenten und umfangreichen Haushaltsbefragungen aus Westafrika 
und Südostasien zu verbessern. Die spezifischen Ziele dieser Arbeit sind: (1) individuelle 
Risiko- und Zeitpräferenzen zu bewerten und deren Relation mit beobachtbaren 
Eigenschaften zu untersuchen, insbesondere den Zusammenhang zwischen Risikoaversion, 
Ungeduld und Armut; (2) die Auswirkungen von Risiko- und Zeitpräferenzen auf die 
Effizienz des individuellen Risikomanagements zu messen; und (3) die zeitliche Stabilität 
von Risikopräferenzen sowie die Auswirkungen von negativen Schocks zu analysieren.  
 
Die ersten beiden Zielstellungen wurden anhand eines Datensatzes zu 211 Kleinbauern aus 
abgeschiedenen Gebieten in Mali und Burkina Faso untersucht. Der Datensatz umfasst 
sozioökonomische Informationen zu Viehhaltungsproduktion- und Management, die 
innerhalb von zwei Erhebungswellen in 2007 und 2011 gesammelt wurden. Zusätzlich 
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wurden in der zweiten Welle ökonomische Feldexperimente durchgeführt, um später 
Risiko- und Zeitpräferenzen eruieren zu können. 
Zur Bearbeitung der dritten Zielstellung wurde ein umfangreicher Paneldatensatz, 
bestehend aus demographischen und sozioökonomischen Informationen über 2812 
Familienvorständen aus ländlichen Gebieten Thailands und Vietnams, angewandt. Diese 
Daten wurden 2008 und 2010 erhoben. Zusätzlich wurden im Jahr 2010 Informationen zu 
Infrastruktur und Institutionen auf Dorfebene gesammelt. Um die Risikoeinstellung des 
Familienvorstandes zu messen, wurde er/sie gebeten, auf einer Skala zwischen null und 
zehn sein/ihr Risikoverhalten selbst einzuschätzen, wobei null “keine Bereitwilligkeit ein 
Risiko einzugehen“ und zehn “völlige Bereitwilligkeit ein Risiko einzugehen“ implizierte. 
 
Methodisch trägt diese Arbeit zum gegenwärtigen Forschungsstand in der 
Verhaltensökonomie in Entwicklungsländern auf verschiedene Weise bei. Erstens findet 
ein Modell des "Diskontierten Nutzens“ seine Anwendung, wobei die Nutzenfunktion im 
Sinne der “Prospect“-Theorie und die Diskontierungsfunktion als quasi-hyperbolisch 
spezifiziert wurde. Die Maximum-Likelihood-Schätzung des Modells bekundet empirisch 
den Zusammenhang zwischen Risikoaversion, Ungeduld und Armut für Kleinbauern in 
Westafrika – eine Region, die lange Zeit wenig Beachtung in ökonomisch-experimentellen 
Feldstudien gefunden hat. Zweitens wird in dieser Arbeit ein bio-ökonomisches Modell 
entwickelt, das das Managementverhalten der Kleinbauern, die dem Risiko ausgesetzt sind, 
dass ihre Rinder an einer Seuche erkranken, abbildet. Dieses Modell stellt eine Erweiterung 
in der ökonomischen Literatur infektiöser Krankheiten dar. Zum einen finden die 
Externalität der Resistenzbildung in Medikamenten, verursacht durch Fehlverhalten des 
Kleinbauern, und zum anderen verhaltensökonomische Parameter wie Risiko- und 
Zeitpräferenzen im Modell Berücksichtigung. Drittens wird die zeitliche Variation der 
Risikopräferenzen durch die geschätzte Variation im Konsum als exogenes Maß für 
Schockerfahrung erklärt. Hierbei werden mit Hilfe eines hierarchischen Modells die 
verschiedenen Auswirkungsebenen von Schocks berücksichtigt, nämlich idiosynkratische 
Schocks auf individueller Ebene und kovariate Schocks auf Makroebene. 
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Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit liefern neue Erkenntnisse in der Entwicklungs- und 
Verhaltensökonomie. Die simultane Schätzung der Risiko- und Zeitpräferenzen zeigt die 
erwarteten Ergebnisse nur teilweise. Kleinbauern aus abgeschiedenen Gebieten in 
Westafrika, die anfällig gegenüber zahlreichen Risiken sind, sind im Durchschnitt 
risikoavers und (überraschenderweise) geduldig. Im Vergleich zu Kleinbauern aus Asien 
scheint der durchschnittliche westafrikanische Kleinbauer risikoaverser und geduldiger zu 
sein. Möglicherweise ist dieses Ergebnis mit der Natur der traditionellen Rinderzucht in 
Westafrika verbunden. Kontrolliert man für andere beobachtbare Eigenschaften, so zeigt 
sich die erwartete positive Korrelation zwischen Risikoaversion, Ungeduld und Armut. Die 
Ergebnisse betonen, welche wichtige Rolle verhaltensökonomische Eigenschaften in der 
Erklärung chronischer Armut spielen und unterstreichen die Notwendigkeit ihrer 
Berücksichtigung in der Gestaltung von Entwicklungsinterventionen. 
Entwicklungsstrategien, die sich zum Beispiel in Asien als erfolgreich erwiesen haben, 
können nicht 1:1 in Afrika angewendet werden. Stattdessen wird ein indigener 
Entwicklungspfad empfohlen, der kulturelle und sozioökonomische Charakteristika der 
Zielgruppe bedenkt.  
Im bio-ökonomischen Modell werden die eruierten Risiko- und Zeitpräferenzen zur 
Abbildung des Risikomanagementprozesses integriert. Die Simulationsergebnisse zeigen, 
dass das Risikomanagement eines risikoaversen und geduldigen Kleinbauern ineffizient ist. 
Die Übernahme der optimalen Managementstrategie würde Verluste in Höhe von 5% des 
jährlichen Einkommens eines durchschnittlichen Bauern vermeiden. Wenn es möglich wäre 
die Risikoaversion des Bauern zu verringern, so könnte er seine Verluste um US$130 pro 
Jahr reduzieren. Diese Ergebnisse implizieren die Notwendigkeit Anreize zu schaffen, die 
den Kleinbauern veranlassen, sein gegenwärtiges Risikomanagement zu verbessern. Zum 
Beispiel könnten spezielle Feldschulen dazu beitragen, Fehlverhalten in der Tierzucht zu 
korrigieren. Das hohe Maß an Risikoaversion ließe sich durch Versicherungen reduzieren. 
Somit könnte möglicherweise das Entscheidungsverhalten des Kleinbauern geändert, und 
damit Verluste vermieden werden. 
Die Überprüfung der zeitlichen Stabilität von Risikopräferenzen anhand des 
Paneldatensatzes aus Thailand und Vietnam zeigt signifikante Veränderungen in der 
Risikoeinstellung. Die Veränderungen in der Risikoeinstellung werden durch verschiedene 
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Schockarten ausgelöst. Idiosynkratische Schocks verändern die Risikoeinstellung in 
Thailand, während kovariate Schocks die Risikoeinstellung in Vietnam beeinflussen. Eine 
mögliche Erklärung ist in den unterschiedlichen politischen Systemen und der damit 
verbundenen Ausrichtung sozialpolitischer Maßnahmen zu finden. Die Ergebnisse deuten 
darauf hin, dass sich Vietnamesen besser gegenüber idiosynkratischen Schocks versichern 
können, zum Beispiel indem sie Sicherheitsnetze bilden, in denen sie sich gegenseitig 
unterstützen. Allerdings sind diese Mechanismen gegenüber kovariaten Schocks weniger 
effektiv. In Thailand scheint die gegenseitige Unterstützung weniger gut zu funktionieren, 
was wiederum auf ein Problem des sozialen Zusammenhalts hinweisen könnte. 
 
 
 
Stichworte: Armut, Risiko- und Zeitpräferenzen, Risikomanagement, Schocks, 
Südostasien, Westafrika 
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ABSTRACT 
Behavioral-economic attitudes and decisions under risk are assumed to play a fundamental 
role in the explanation of persistent poverty in developing countries. The literature suggests 
that households, who are constrained in income and assets, and hence in their ability to 
cope with shocks, are more likely to invest in low-risk options with low returns, thereby 
failing to escape from poverty. In addition, poor households are less likely to forego part of 
their current consumption to invest in long-term investments with higher returns in the 
distant future that might improve their livelihoods. Therefore, risk and time preferences are 
two important behavioral attitudes that affect the management decisions under risk. 
 
Individual attitudes towards risk and time and individual’s risk management are the core of 
this thesis. Overall, it is aimed to improve our understanding of the interrelation between 
risk and time preferences, risk management and poverty in developing countries using data 
from economic field experiments and comprehensive household surveys collected in West 
Africa and Southeast Asia. The specific objectives are to (1) evaluate individual risk and 
time preferences and examine the relation between preferences and observable 
characteristics, in particular the relation between risk aversion, impatience and poverty; (2) 
assess the extent to which risk and time preferences impact the efficiency of individual 
management decisions under risk; and (3) analyze the temporal stability of risk preferences 
and the impact of adverse shocks. 
 
The first two objectives are investigated using data from 211 small-scale cattle farmers 
living in remote areas of Mali and Burkina Faso. The data set consists of socio-economic 
information on cattle herd production and management collected during two waves in 2007 
and 2011. In addition to the second survey wave, economic field experiments were 
conducted with the household head in order to elicit his risk and time preferences.  
A comprehensive panel data set containing demographic and socio-economic information 
of 2812 household heads from rural areas in Thailand and Vietnam collected in 2008 and 
2010 is used to address the third objective. In addition, information on village infrastructure 
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and institutions is available from 2010. Individual risk preferences are measured by a 
survey-based item on individuals’ willingness to take risk. Respondents were asked to 
classify themselves on a scale between zero and ten, where zero indicated an 
“unwillingness to take risk” and ten implied “being fully prepared to take risk”. 
 
Methodologically, the thesis contributes to current research of behavioral economics in 
developing countries in different ways. First, a discounted utility model is applied that 
specifies the utility function in accordance to prospect theory and the discounting function 
in accordance to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The maximum likelihood estimation of the 
discounted utility model provides empirical evidence on the relation between risk aversion, 
impatience and poverty for cattle farmers that live in risky environments in West Africa – a 
region that has long been unrecognized in economic experimental studies. Second, a bio-
economic model is developed that portrays cattle farmers’ management under the risk of a 
livestock disease. The model extends the economic literature on infectious diseases by the 
integration of the externality of drug resistance caused by farmers’ mismanagement and the 
consideration of behavioral parameters such as farmers’ risk and time preferences. Third, 
temporal variation in risk attitudes is explained by an exogenous measure of shocks, 
namely estimated variation in consumption. Hereby, multilevel modeling allows taking into 
account the different impact levels of shocks: idiosyncratic shocks at the individual level 
and covariate shocks that are correlated across individuals at the aggregate level.  
 
The results obtained in this thesis contribute to existing knowledge and help improve on 
theories of development economics and behavioral economics. The simultaneous 
estimation of cattle farmers’ risk and time preferences shows only partly the expected 
results. Cattle farmers from remote areas in West Africa, vulnerable to miscellaneous risks, 
are on average risk-averse and (surprisingly) patient. In comparison to farmers from Asia, 
the average West African farmer appears more risk-averse and shows longer time horizons. 
Possibly, this result is connected to the nature of traditional cattle farming in West Africa. 
Allowing for individual heterogeneity and analyzing the correlation between poverty and 
preferences shows the expected result, i.e. poverty is positively associated with risk 
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aversion and impatience. However, the findings highlight the importance of behavioral 
attitudes in the explanation of persistent poverty and suggest their consideration into the 
design of development interventions. Development strategies that were proven to be 
successful in Asia may not be easily transferred to Africa. Instead, pursuing indigenous 
development paths and considering cultural and socio-economic characteristics is 
recommended. 
Having obtained cattle farmers’ risk and time preferences, they are integrated into the bio-
economic model of a livestock disease in order to portray farmers’ disease management 
process. Simulation results show that the disease management of a risk-averse and patient 
farmer is not efficient. The adoption of the optimal strategy would avoid losses of 
approximately 5% of farmer’s annual income. In addition, if the same farmer would be less 
risk-averse, he could reduce losses by US$130 per year. The results call for incentives that 
induce farmers to improve current risk management. For example, livestock field schools 
may reduce disease management failures and livestock insurances may lead to a reduction 
in farmers risk aversion, thereby increasing the efficiency of the management process. 
Testing the temporal stability of risk attitudes using the panel data set from rural Thailand 
and Vietnam shows significant changes in risk attitudes over time. The changes in risk 
attitudes over time are caused by different kind of shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks alter risk 
attitudes in Thailand, whereas covariate shocks affect risk attitudes in Vietnam. A possible 
explanation is the difference in political systems and consequently the focus of socio-
political measures. The results suggest that Vietnamese respondents may be better in 
insuring idiosyncratic risks for example through safety nets. However this mechanism is 
less effective to cope with correlated risks. In Thailand, mutual insurance across individuals 
does not seem to work well and may point to a problem of social cohesion. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Attitudes towards risk and time, poverty, risk management, shocks, Southeast 
Asia, West Africa  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Motivation  
Attitudes towards risk and the ability to manage risk are assumed to be two important 
elements in the vicious cycle of poverty for rural households in developing countries 
(Mosley and Verschoor 2005). These two elements characterize a self-reinforcing 
mechanism that may cause poverty to persist (Azariadis and Stachurski 2005; Barrett and 
Carter 2013). Following Mosley and Verschoor (2005), the hypothesis of the vicious cycle 
of poverty can be described as follows: The poorer the household, the less means are 
available to cope with risks and the larger is the risk aversion. In turn, risk-averse farmers 
are more likely to invest in low risk and low return investments. As a consequence, abilities 
to manage risks further deteriorate and increase the likelihood that the farm household 
remains poor (Figure 1.1). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Vicious cycle of poverty 
Source: Mosley and Verschoor (2005) 
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Empirical evidence from rural India (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993), West Africa 
(Carter 1997) and East Africa (Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009) support this hypothesis. Hence, 
small-scale farmers that live in risky environments without access to functioning insurance 
and credit markets practice a ‘survival algorithm’ (Lipton 1968: 337), preserving the 
livelihood of the household at the cost of an efficient allocation of resources, thereby 
perpetuating poverty (Dercon and Christiaensen 2011).  
 
The practice of a survival algorithm does not mean to blame the poor for their own 
misfortune. It rather means that there are structural mechanisms that may alter individuals’ 
risk attitudes in ways that lead to management decisions that sustain their lives in poverty 
(Barrett and Carter 2013). Although the temporal variability of risk attitudes is 
controversially discussed in the literature (e.g. Love and Robison 1984; Malmendier and 
Nagel 2011), Barrett and Carter (2013) suggest one mechanism, among others, that may 
cause risk attitudes to change, i.e. the impact of negative shocks as a key driver of poverty. 
For example, individuals exposed to violence in Afghanistan (Callen et al. 2014) or to a 
natural disaster like the tsunami in Thailand (Cassar, Healy, and Kessler 2011) were found 
to increase risk aversion.  
 
Recent literature considers not only attitudes towards risk as an important behavioral 
parameter in poverty dynamics, but also attitudes towards time (Lybbert and McPeak 2012; 
Barrett and Carter 2013). Laajaj (2012) shows that pessimistic future prospects induce asset 
poor farmers in Mozambique to decrease their time horizons, thereby worsening future 
consumption and increasing their likelihood to remain poor. Voors et al. (2012) find a 
similar pattern, namely that individuals that experienced the civil war in Burundi have 
shorter time horizons than individuals that were not exposed to war. They follow that 
exposure to violence can hence alter savings behavior and investment decisions. 
 
Taking into account the findings from the recent literature may suggest adding two 
components to the vicious cycle of poverty as described by Mosley and Verschoor (2005), 
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namely (i) time preferences as a another important attitude that influences management 
decisions and (ii) shocks as one key driver of poverty and assumed to change individual 
preferences. The adjusted vicious cycle is illustrated in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Adjusted vicious cycle of poverty 
Source: Mosley and Verschoor (2005), modified 
 
In this thesis, individual preferences, in particular attitudes towards risk and time, and 
individual risk management take center stage. The overall objective of the thesis is to 
derive new insights on the interrelation between risk and time preferences, risk 
management and poverty using data from economic field experiments and comprehensive 
household surveys conducted in West Africa and Southeast Asia. The thesis consists of 
three essays, each addressing a central question inside the framework described above: 
 
Essay 1:  How risk-averse and impatient are poor farmers from West Africa and how much 
do their preferences differ from Asian farmers?  
Essay 2:  Do risk and time preferences affect the efficiency of management decisions 
under risk and if yes, to what extent?  
Essay 3:  Are risk attitudes variable over time and if yes, to what extent are they affected 
by adverse shocks?  
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The main focus of each essay and their interrelationships are illustrated in Figure 1.3. 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Overview and interrelation of essay topics 
Source: Mosley and Verschoor (2005), modified 
 
In the next section, the objectives of each essay are introduced in more detail, followed by a 
depiction of methodologies in section three. Section four describes the data sets, and 
section five summarizes the results. Conclusions and prospects for future research are 
derived in section six, and finally section seven presents the outline of the overall thesis. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
The first essay focuses on individual risk and time preferences of small-scale cattle farmers 
from remote areas in West Africa. Small cattle herds are farmers’ major asset - often 
exposed to many kinds of negative shocks such as drought, pests or diseases. Following the 
literature, one would expect that these farmers, who are asset poor and living in risky 
environments, are risk-averse and impatient (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Yesuf and 
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Bluffstone 2009; Laajaj 2012). The objective of the first essay is to analyze if this 
expectation is true. Therefore, it is aimed to evaluate farmers’ risk and time preferences and 
improve our understanding of the relation between preferences and individual 
characteristics such as low standards of living. In addition, since most studies that 
simultaneously measure time and risk preferences were conducted in Asia (Tanaka, 
Camerer, and Nguyen 2010; Nguyen 2011), the essay intends to extend existing knowledge 
of risk and time preferences to Africa. The specific objectives of the first essay are to: 
(i) simultaneously assess both the risk and time preferences of small-scale cattle farmers 
in Mali and Burkina Faso; 
(ii) examine how demographic and socio-economic characteristics are correlated with 
farmers’ risk and time preferences; and 
(iii) compare the findings with the results of few existing studies that were mostly 
conducted in Asia. 
 
In the second essay, the focus is on the relation between cattle farmers’ preferences and 
their management decision given the risk that their cattle might become infected with one 
of the major livestock diseases in sub-Saharan Africa (Cecchi and Mattioli 2009), namely 
African animal trypanosomosis (AAT). Disease management options are few and the most 
common are prophylactic and curative drug treatment (Holmes 1997). An additional 
problem is the emergence of drug resistance in AAT pathogens that arises mainly because 
farmers do not correctly apply drugs (Grace et al. 2009; Clausen et al. 2010).  
In this essay, we develop a bio-economic model combining ecological aspects, i.e. the 
spread of AAT infections and the development of resistance, with economic aspects, i.e. 
farmers’ management decision given the elicited risk and time preferences from the first 
essay and the resulting costs and benefits. The second essay contributes to the dearth of 
literature that integrates economic and ecological aspects (Ceddia et al. 2013) in two ways. 
First, the study considers the externality of pathogen resistance to drugs and second, it 
portrays the decision making process of farmers with observed individual risk and time 
preferences. In particular, the second essay aims to: 
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(i) identify the privately optimal allocation of curative and preventive drug control that 
minimizes the present discounted value of total disease losses from AAT; 
(ii) examine if, and to what extent, losses could be avoided if farmers would reduce drug 
misuse; and 
(iii) analyze if, and to what extent, losses could be avoided if specific circumstances 
would enable changes in farmers’ risk and time preferences. 
 
The third essay focuses on the temporal stability of risk preferences. In this respect, the 
literature can be divided into studies (mostly from developed countries) that confirm risk 
attitudes are constant over time (Vlaev, Chater, and Stewart 2009; Wölbert and Riedl 2013; 
Lönnqvist et al. 2014) and studies (mostly from developing countries) that show variability 
over time (Doss, McPeak, and Barrett 2008; Voors et al. 2012; Callen et al. 2014). The 
second strand of literature finds that covariate shocks such as natural disasters (Cassar, 
Healy, and Kessler 2011) or exposure to war (Callen et al. 2014) alter risk attitudes over 
time, while idiosyncratic shocks show no significant impact (Doss et al. 2008). 
The objective of this essay is to test the temporal stability of risk attitudes for rural 
households in Southeast Asia and analyze if this ‘pattern’ that covariate shocks affect risk 
attitudes, but idiosyncratic shocks do not affect risk attitudes can be confirmed for these 
households. In addition, we aim to analyze the relation between risk attitudes, shocks and 
poverty. The contribution of this essay is to explain temporal variation in risk attitudes by 
using an exogenous measure of shocks in the absence of a natural experiment. In order to 
obtain such an exogenous measure of shocks, we follow Günther and Harttgen (2009) and 
estimate a multilevel model of consumption variation. In particular, the third essay intends 
to: 
(i) investigate, if and to what extent, risk attitudes alter over time in rural Thailand and 
Vietnam; 
(ii) analyze the impact of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks on changes in individual risk 
attitudes over time; and 
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(iii) explore whether the impact of shocks is different for poor and non-poor individuals. 
 
1.3 Methodologies 
The underlying thesis applies a number of theoretical and empirical methodologies that are 
shortly introduced in what follows. 
 
In the first essay, we apply a discounted utility model to identify the risk and time 
preferences of West African cattle farmers. This model allows us to explain dynamic 
decision making behavior under uncertainty. As Mosley and Verschoor (2005) suggest, in 
order to check for the existence of the survival algorithm of poor farmers, one should go 
beyond the dominant economic decision theories such as expected utility theory and 
exponential discounting. Therefore, we specify farmers’ utility function in accordance with 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) to capture 
risk in both gain and loss situations along with respondents’ weightings of probabilities. In 
order to identify farmers’ discounting function, we use a quasi-hyperbolic specification. We 
simultaneously estimate the risk and time preference parameters of the discounted utility 
model, using the maximum likelihood technique suggested by Nguyen (2011). The 
corresponding maximum likelihood program was written in Stata 11. 
 
In the second essay, we study cattle farmers’ management decision given the risk of AAT 
infection in cattle. We develop a bio-economic model in which we simulate economic 
outputs, such as production losses, based on the epidemiological interactions among vector, 
host, and farmers’ disease management. We apply the dynamic optimization framework 
provided by Gersovitz and Hammer (2005) and adjust it to our case of AAT. Both 
ecological and economic aspects are integrated in the model. From the ecological 
perspective, the spread of AAT infection and the development of drug resistance through 
farmers’ drug misuse are considered. The economic side takes into account farmers’ 
disease management and related costs and benefits. In order to better portray farmers’ 
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disease management the discounted utility framework from the first essay is incorporated. 
Hence, it is possible to reflect farmers’ valuation of disease losses and their disease 
management behavior towards risk and time. The corresponding simulation procedure was 
specified as a system of ordinary differential equations (ODE) in Matlab R2013b. 
 
The third essay aims to analyze if and to what extent negative shocks as a key driver of 
poverty lead to a temporal variation in risk attitudes. The analysis is conducted in a three-
step framework. First, we exogenously measure the impact of shocks, because the use of 
self-reported shocks may generate biased results, since they are likely to be interrelated 
with risk attitudes. Therefore, we follow Günther and Harttgen (2009) and estimate 
variation in consumption in a multilevel model, where variation in consumption at the 
individual level serves as a proxy for idiosyncratic shocks and variation in consumption at 
the aggregate level is used as a measure for covariate shocks. Second, we use the two 
estimated idiosyncratic and covariate shock proxies to exogenously explain changes in 
individual risk attitudes over time. Third, we compare the estimated impact of shocks on 
risk attitudes among individuals that we categorized according to their poverty status as 
chronically poor, transient poor or non-poor. The multilevel analysis was conducted in 
Stata 13. 
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1.4 Data 
The measurement of behavioral attitudes, the assessment of risk management strategies and 
the examination of interdependencies with individual and household characteristics is based 
on economic field experiments and socio-economic household surveys. 
 
The data used in the first essay and in the second essay come from the project “Economics 
of African Animal Trypanosomosis (AAT) Management Strategies under Risk and Time 
Preferences” funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG WA 1002/8 - 1). We 
conducted a household survey in two waves, the first wave in 2007 and the second wave in 
2011. The study included only households that owned cattle within the last twelve months. 
We collected demographic information and detailed economic data on cattle herd 
production such as herd structure, inputs used, outputs produced and selling prices from the 
household head. From the two surveys, we obtained data from 211 small-scale cattle 
farmers; 107 farmers living in ten villages in the circle around Sikasso in southeastern Mali 
and 104 farmers from five villages in the province of Kénédougou in southwestern Burkina 
Faso (Figure 1.4). We also obtained data on AAT prevalence and drug resistance from an 
epidemiological study in the same area (Clausen et al. 2010). 
During the 2011 household survey, we also conducted economic field experiments to elicit 
farmers’ risk and time preferences. The design of experiments followed Tanaka et al. 
(2010), calibrated to the local conditions in Mali and Burkina Faso. In the risk experiment 
respondents had the choice between paired lotteries; one constant lottery with a likely, but 
small payoff and the other lottery with an unlikely, but large payoff that was increased in 
every round. The time experiment was constructed as a choice between a smaller payoff 
promised in the near future and a larger payoff promised in the distant future. Both 
experiments were played with real money to assure that participants show their true 
preferences (Andersen et al. 2006).  
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Figure 1.4 Study area in West Africa 
Source: Own illustration based on Google Maps (2014) 
 
In the third essay the stage changes location from Mali and Burkina Faso to Thailand and 
Vietnam (Figure 1.5). The data in the third essay comes from the project “Impact of Shocks 
on the Vulnerability to Poverty: Consequences for Development of Emerging Southeast 
Asian Economies”, funded by the German Research Foundation (FOR 756). We use 
demographic and socio-economic information of 2812 heads and decision-makers of rural 
households in Thailand and Vietnam that were collected in 2008 and 2010. Information on 
income, consumption, education and health are available at the individual level and at the 
household level. In addition to the household survey in 2010, the village head was 
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interviewed about infrastructure and institutions in the village. We use the information from 
the village head at the aggregate level in our multilevel model. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Study area in Southeast Asia 
Source: Hardeweg, Klasen and Waibel (2013), modified 
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In order to elicit individual risk attitudes, we do not use experimental data like in the first 
essay, but we rely on a survey-based measure that was originally developed by Dohmen et 
al. (2011). In this survey-based measure respondents were asked to classify themselves on 
an eleven-point Likert scale, where zero indicated unwillingness to take risk and ten 
implied being fully prepared to take risk. Although the survey-based measure is not 
sufficient to reflect the shape of the utility function, several studies have shown that it can 
predict the outcome of an experimental measure (Hardeweg, Menkhoff, and Waibel 2013; 
Lönnqvist et al. 2014; Chuang and Schechter 2014). 
The next section presents the results of each essay. 
 
1.5 Results 
In the first essay we expected the poor small-scale cattle farmers from West Africa that are 
exposed to numerous adverse events to be risk-averse and impatient. However, results 
confirm only expected risk aversion. The estimates on discount rates and present biasedness 
indicate longer time horizons. Furthermore, in comparison to farmers from Asia (Nguyen 
and Leung 2010; Tanaka et al. 2010; Liu 2013), the average West African farmer appears 
more risk-averse and more patient. One possible explanation is the different livelihood 
strategy of traditional cattle farming in West Africa; one that is a long-term and low-return 
investment.  
Examining correlations between preferences and individual characteristics show that 
farmers who are more constrained in income and assets are likely to be more risk-averse 
and impatient. The result suggests that poverty is associated with larger risk aversion and 
impatience, which is consistent with other studies on risk preferences in Africa (Wik et al. 
2004; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009) and time preferences in Africa (Holden, Shiferaw, and 
Wik 1998; Nielsen 2001) and in Asia (Pender 1996; Tanaka et al. 2010; Nguyen 2011). 
This finding also provides empirical evidence on the first part of the vicious cycle of 
poverty-hypothesis.  
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The second essay aimed to examine the relation between cattle farmers’ preferences and 
the efficiency of their disease management decisions. The integration of farmers’ elicited 
risk and time preferences from the first essay into the bio-economic model of AAT shows 
that the disease management of the average farmer who is risk-averse and patient is not 
efficient. Results suggest that an efficient disease management consists of maximizing 
prophylaxis in order to protect animals from the risk of AAT infection supported by a small 
number of curative treatments for those animals where prophylaxis was not effective. 
Compared to observed disease management practices, a farmer that adopts the optimal 
strategy would avoid losses of US$125 per year – an amount that approximately 
corresponds to 5% of farmer’s income from cattle production. 
In addition, results show that a reduction in drug misuse that leads to a decrease in the 
incidence of resistance scales down the need for treatment, specifically the need for 
prophylactic treatment. The avoidance of every second treatment failure would save a 
farmer US$128 per year. 
Results also demonstrate that a reduction in farmers’ risk aversion would be associated with 
higher treatment rates that reduce losses and save treatment expenditures in the future. 
Assuming that the average farmer is risk-taking and patient, he could save approximately 
US$130 per year.  
 
The third essay intended to test the temporal stability of risk attitudes and the relation 
between risk attitudes, shocks and poverty in rural areas of Thailand and Vietnam. 
Following the findings of studies that use long-term panel data from developing countries 
(Doss et al. 2008; Voors et al. 2012; Callen et al. 2014), it was expected that risk attitudes 
change over time through the impact of covariate shocks. Results confirm variability of risk 
attitudes over time in Thailand and Vietnam. However, the impact of shocks on risk 
attitudes is different in the two countries. In Vietnam, we find that covariate shocks 
increase risk aversion, whereas idiosyncratic shocks increase risk aversion in Thailand. We 
argue that this country-specific difference may be explained by political differences, 
especially with respect to differences in socio-political measures in the past.  
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In addition, separating the impact of shocks for poor and non-poor respondents, we find 
that the magnitude of the covariate shock impact is larger for poor than for non-poor 
respondents in Vietnam. Following the hypothesis of the vicious cycle of poverty, poor 
respondents may perceive the shock impact to be larger and thereby, increase their risk 
aversion. Results also suggest that respondents living in persistent poverty in Vietnam 
perform better in coping with idiosyncratic shocks possibly by supporting each other in 
informal safety nets (Dercon 2002; De Weerdt 2005; De Weerdt and Dercon 2006). In 
contrast, such safety nets seem not to function well in Thailand. 
 
1.6 Conclusion and future research 
Based on the empirical evidences on the relation between risk attitudes, risk management 
and poverty from West Africa and Southeast Asia we submit the following important 
implications for development interventions.  
 
The main finding from the first essay that the average West African cattle farmer is risk-
averse and patient suggests that development interventions should take into account such 
specific behavioral attitudes of poor people. In many cases, development projects are of 
short-term nature and designed to produce quick results, which does not correspond to the 
time horizon of cattle farmers in West Africa. In general, more attention should be focused 
on pursuing indigenous development paths that consider the specific cultural and socio-
economic characteristics, including risk and time preferences, of the target population. 
However, this conclusion is based on the estimation of a discounted utility model that we 
specified under prospect theory and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Although we are able to 
derive more information than under the dominant theories of expected utility theory and 
exponential discounting, one could test the robustness of this result by a non-parametric 
estimation without specifying any functional form a priori (Hey and Orme 1994; Harrison 
and Rutström 2008).  
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The main finding from the second essay that the survival algorithm of the average West 
African cattle farmer in managing the risk of AAT infection is not efficient implies the 
need for generating incentives to optimize current risk management. For example, livestock 
field schools could provide special training in drug management to reduce treatment 
failures and the risk of drug resistance development (Grace et al. 2008). In addition, 
specific livestock insurance mechanisms that reduce farmers risk aversion could increase 
the efficiency of farmers’ disease management. Other interventions might include treatment 
subsidies to encourage farmers to make higher investments in prophylaxis in order to 
reduce the probability of infection. 
One could extend the current bio-economic model and test the usefulness of such 
interventions by implementing other scenarios. However, the current model specification as 
an ODE system is able to identify the efficient risk management strategy of the average 
farmer. Alternatively, an agent-based model (ABM) would allow the analysis of the disease 
management efficiency of heterogeneous agents with unique characteristics such as 
individual risk and time preferences (Matthews et al. 2007; Schlüter et al. 2012). 
 
From the third essay we conclude that risk attitudes are not a stable function over time and 
we confirm the existence of a structural mechanism as suggested by Barrett and Carter 
(2013) that negative shocks cause risk attitudes to change. However, the country-specific 
differences in the kind of shocks that cause risk attitudes to change suggest that there are 
well-functioning mutual insurance mechanisms that enable the poor to cope with 
idiosyncratic shocks in Vietnam. In contrast, such mechanisms, where individuals support 
each other seem not to work well in Thailand. We conclude that this finding possibly 
indicates a lack of social cohesion in Thailand. 
However, it remains unclear if the increase in risk aversion indeed translates into low risk 
investments with low returns as hypothesized by Mosley and Verschoor (2005). Creating a 
long-term panel data set that consists of three consecutive survey waves would allow 
investigations into what extent changes in risk attitudes over time triggered by idiosyncratic 
and covariate shocks lead to changes in real investment behavior. 
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1.7 Outline 
The three essays are organized in the following three chapters. Chapter 2 contains the first 
essay “Simultaneous Estimation of Risk and Time Preferences among Small-scale Farmers 
in West Africa” that was published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics in 
2014. Sabine Liebenehm collected data, estimated the model and wrote the first essay, 
while Hermann Waibel performed the supervisory role and provided suggestions on 
different aspects of the manuscript.  
 
Chapter 3 contains the second essay “Optimal Drug Control under Risk of Drug Resistance 
– The Case of African Animal Trypanosomosis” that was submitted to Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. In the second essay, Sabine Liebenehm collected primary and 
secondary data, developed the model and wrote the essay. Bernard Bett, Cristobal Verdugo 
and Mohamed Said advised on the set up of the model and commented on essay content. 
 
The third essay titled “Changes in Risk Attitudes and Vulnerability to Idiosyncratic and 
Covariate Shocks – Evidence from Panel Household Data in Thailand and Vietnam” is 
organized in Chapter 4. A former version of this essay has been presented at the PEGNet 
Conference and at the AEL Conference in 2014. Sabine Liebenehm used the DFG FOR 756 
data of Thailand and Vietnam from 2008 and 2010, estimated the multilevel model and 
wrote the manuscript. Lukas Menkhoff and Hermann Waibel took a supervisory role and 
provided suggestions on different aspects. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the history of 
the manuscripts. 
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Table 1.1 Overview of essays  
 Title Authors 
Presented/ Submitted/ 
Published 
    
Chapter 2 
Simultaneous Estimation of 
Risk and Time Preferences 
among Small-scale Farmers in 
West Africa 
S. Liebenehm 
and H. Waibel  
Published in: American 
Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 2014, 96(5): 
1420- 1438 
 
Earlier versions presented at: 
GeWiSoLa Conference 2013, 
September 25-27, Berlin, 
Germany 
PEGNet Conference 2011, 
September 07-09, Hamburg, 
Germany 
    
    
Chapter 3 
Optimal Drug Control under 
Risk of Drug Resistance – The 
Case of African Animal 
Trypanosomosis 
S. Liebenehm; 
B. Bett; C. 
Verdugo and 
M. Said 
Submitted to: Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 2015 
    
    
Chapter 4 
Changes in Risk Attitudes and 
Vulnerability to Idiosyncratic 
and Covariate Shocks – 
Evidence from Panel 
Household Data in Thailand 
and Vietnam 
S. Liebenehm; 
H. Waibel and 
L. Menkhoff 
Presented at:  
PEGNet Conference 2014; 
September 18-19, Lusaka, 
Zambia 
AEL Verein für Socialpolitik 
Conference 2014; June 27-
28, Passau, Germany 
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CHAPTER 2:  SIMULTANEOUS ESTIMATION OF RISK AND TIME 
PREFERENCES AMONG SMALL-SCALE CATTLE FARMERS 
IN WEST AFRICA 
 
This chapter is an article accepted for publication in 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
following peer review. 
The definitive publisher-authenticated version  
Liebenehm, S. and H. Waibel (2014). “Simultaneous Estimation of Risk and Time 
Preferences among Small-Scale Cattle Farmers in West Africa.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 96(5): 1420-1438  
is available online at  
http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/content/96/5/1420. 
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CHAPTER 3:  OPTIMAL DRUG CONTROL UNDER RISK OF DRUG 
RESISTANCE – THE CASE OF AFRICAN ANIMAL 
TRYPANOSOMOSIS 
 
This chapter is an extended version of 
Liebenehm, S., B. Bett, C. Verdugo and M. Said. “Optimal Drug Control under Risk of 
Drug Resistance Development – the Case of African Animal Trypanosomosis in West 
Africa” 
Submitted to Journal of Agricultural Economics 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we examine two widely used treatment strategies for African animal 
trypanosomosis (AAT) in West Africa, namely, preventive drug control ex ante AAT 
infection and curative drug control ex post AAT infection, to investigate which 
combination of these alternative strategies is economically optimal for cattle farmers. 
We develop a bio-economic model to simulate the economic consequences of treatment 
strategies in a dynamic scenario that takes into account the interactions among vector, host, 
and livestock farmers. In this model, we allow for the evolution of drug-resistant 
trypanosomes through trypanocide misuse and aim to simulate the observed behavior of 
cattle farmers by including the elicited risk and time preferences of a sample of 202 cattle 
farmers in Mali and Burkina Faso. 
The results show that the private optimal mix of treatment strategies involves preventive 
treatment until a maximum number of susceptible cattle are protected from the risk of AAT 
infection. In addition, preventive treatment must be supported by a small number of 
curative treatments for infected cattle. Compared to treatment strategies observed in the 
field, this optimal mix of treatment strategies would save 5% of the annual income of a 
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livestock farmer in the study areas. We also demonstrate that the improvement of AAT 
treatment practices reduces the prevalence of AAT and saves approximately US$128 per 
farmer. Finally, we show that farmer’s risk aversion behavior costs him approximately 
US$130. 
 
 
Keywords: African animal trypanosomosis, bio-economic model, risk preference, time 
preference, West Africa. 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The link between economics and epidemiology offers considerable potential to improve our 
understanding how infectious diseases evolve and spread (Gersovitz and Hammer 2003). 
On the one hand, epidemiology provides dynamic mathematical models that can describe 
how diseases are transmitted either between hosts or between vectors and hosts. 
Economics, on the other hand, can assess the costs and benefits of disease interventions by 
considering the externalities and behavioral aspects of decision making and can thus help to 
allocate scarce resources. 
 
The economic literature on infectious diseases is nevertheless in its infancy (Gersovitz and 
Hammer 2004; Klein et al. 2007; Ceddia et al. 2013). Previous studies focus either on one 
specific disease, i.e., HIV/Aids (Geoffard and Philipson 1996; Kremer 1996; Lakdawalla, 
Sood, and Goldman 2006), or on one specific treatment, i.e., vaccination (Brito, Sheshinski, 
and Intriligator 1991; Geoffard and Philipson 1997; Francis 1997; 2004; Barrett and Hoel 
2007; Houy 2013). However, most studies do not consider externalities, and they 
insufficiently model behavioral aspects.  
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One exception is Gersovitz and Hammer (2004), which is among the first studies to 
explicitly consider two types of externalities, i.e., (i) the spread of infections through 
infectious hosts and (ii) treatment actions of one agent that affect the probability of other 
agents becoming infected.  
 
This paper contributes to this body of literature in two ways. First, we consider the 
externality of pathogen resistance to both therapeutic and prophylactic drugs. Second, to 
reflect the decision making of farmers, we incorporate a discounted utility function for 
optimizing treatment strategies with observed individual risk and time preferences. 
In particular, we aim to investigate the optimal control of tsetse-transmitted African animal 
trypanosomosis (AAT) in cattle from an individual livestock farmer’s point of view. Cattle 
farmers’ major control strategy for AAT is the application of drugs, namely, trypanocides, 
as either a preventive or a curative treatment. Trypanocides are commonly available to 
farmers living in remote areas and, at approximately US$1 per treated animal, are generally 
affordable (McDermott and Coleman 2001). However, frequent cases of misuse cause 
resistance in pathogens to trypanocides and reduce their effectiveness (Grace et al. 2009; 
Clausen et al. 2010). Therefore, our research aims to identify the optimal allocation of 
curative and preventive drug treatment given the potential for drug-resistant trypanosomes.  
 
To answer this research question, we develop a bio-economic model in which we simulate 
economic outputs, such as production losses, based on the epidemiological interactions 
among vector, host, and treatment regimen. In so doing, we allow for the evolution of 
resistance through trypanocide misuse. In addition, we incorporate a discounted utility 
function to consider the individual valuation of disease losses and the resulting behavior 
toward risk and time. The simulation is based on socio-economic and epidemiological data 
on 202 cattle-dependent small-scale farmers in West Africa. We aim to identify the 
privately optimal allocation of curative and preventive drug control that minimizes the 
present discounted value of total disease losses from AAT.  
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In the next section, we introduce the impact of AAT in West Africa and the study region. In 
section three, we describe the bio-economic model, which is followed by a detailed model 
specification. In section five, we discuss the main findings. Finally, in section six, we draw 
conclusions and provide policy recommendations. 
 
3.2 African animal trypanosomosis in West Africa 
AAT has been considered one of the most important constraints to livestock and crop-
livestock production in sub-Saharan Africa (Kristjanson et al. 1999). Estimated total losses 
from AAT are in the range of US$1.3-4.5 billion annually, depending on whether direct or 
indirect impacts are considered (Swallow 2000). Further, AAT reduces physical outputs 
such as milk offtake and draft power by up to 40%. Thus, in a country that is largely 
affected by AAT, total agricultural production is reduced by up to 10% (Agyemang et al. 
1991; McDermott and Coleman 2001). 
 
Disease management strategies for AAT in cattle include (i) the application of trypanocidal 
drugs to control the parasites (trypanosomes); (ii) the control of the vector of the disease, 
namely, the tsetse fly, by spraying insecticides or by utilizing screens and fly traps that are 
more environmentally friendly; and (iii) the breeding of trypanotolerant cattle breeds, such 
as the N’Dama or Baoulé, which are able to ward off the infection to some degree (Holmes 
1997).  
The application of trypanocidal drugs is the only strategy that is widely applied by 
individual farmers because the drugs are commonly available and, at approximately US$1 
per treated animal, generally affordable (McDermott and Coleman 2001). The drugs can be 
applied either as a curative treatment ex post AAT infection once symptoms are observed or 
as a preventive measure ex ante AAT infection on a regular basis.  
However, farmers lack knowledge about the correct use of drugs. For example, farmers 
incorrectly dilute the drugs with water, disregard the bodyweight of the animal in 
administering the drugs, or inject the drugs in the wrong place. In other cases, farmers use 
expired or poorly stored drugs, which are less effective. Such misuse of trypanocides has 
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led to the widespread development of drug-resistant AAT parasites (Grace et al. 2009; 
Clausen et al. 2010).  
In this paper, we study AAT treatment strategies in West Africa, particularly in 
southeastern Mali and southwestern Burkina Faso, where the prevalence of AAT and 
trypanocide resistance is high (Clausen et al. 2010). 
Both epidemiological and socio-economic data are available for this area and will be used 
in our bio-economic model.  
The data come from a multi-disciplinary research project led by the International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI) to ensure the future efficacy of trypanocides as one component of 
integrated AAT control. Within this project, epidemiologists assessed the prevalence of 
AAT and identified specific “hot spots” of drug resistance (Clausen et al. 2010). 
Economists simultaneously collected demographic and socio-economic data on cattle 
farmers to understand how AAT and trypanocide resistance are managed (Liebenehm, 
Affognon, and Waibel 2011a; Liebenehm, Affognon, and Waibel 2011b).  
In addition, economists re-visited the study site in 2011 and conducted a socio-economic 
survey of a random sub-sample of farmers. In particular, the survey aimed to improve the 
understanding of farmer decision-making behavior. Therefore, economic field experiments 
were conducted to identify farmers’ subjective probabilities of AAT and trypanocide 
resistance and to elicit farmers’ preferences regarding risk and time (Liebenehm and 
Waibel 2014).  
We calibrate our bio-economic model with observed data from 202 small-scale cattle 
farmers collected over the course of the inter-disciplinary research project from 2002 to 
2007 and the follow-up project in 2011. Table 3.1 presents an overview of the observed 
statistics. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics  
 Value 
Standard 
deviation 
Source 
Epidemiological data    
Mean prevalence of AAT 0.664 0.473 Epidemiological 
survey 2002-
2007 Mean prevalence of trypanocide resistance 0.707 0.458 
    
Socio-economic data    
General    
Total number of cattle 4027  
Socio-economic 
survey 2011 
Total number of cattle affected by AAT 843  
Total number of cattle affected by AAT 
with no response to treatment 
219  
Total number of cattle that died from AAT 71  
    
AAT disease management    
Percentage of farmers that administer drugs  51.485  
Socio-economic 
survey 2007 
Percentage of farmers that apply curative 
drugs 
76.289  
Percentage of farmers that apply preventive 
drugs 
28.767  
Percentage of farmers that report treatment 
failure with curative drugs  
18.421  
Percentage of farmers that report treatment 
failure with preventive drugs  
27.273  
    
Behavioral attitudes     
Mean estimated risk aversion 0.112 0.006 
Socio-economic 
survey 2011 
Mean estimated loss aversion 1.351 0.262 
Mean estimated time preference 0.001 0.0001 
Mean subjective probability of AAT 
infection 
28.962 10.48 
Mean subjective probability of sensitive 
AAT infection 
16.644 7.868 
Mean subjective probability of resistant 
AAT infection 
12.464 6.091 
Note: N = 202. 
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The epidemiological statistics indicate that 66% of farmers live in an area in which AAT is 
prevalent and that 70% of farmers live in an area in which resistance to trypanocides is 
evident.  
Furthermore, from the recent socio-economic survey, we know that the 202 surveyed 
farmers possessed 4027 cattle in total. On average, each farmer kept 20 animals, which is 
below the average of 38 heads in sub-Saharan countries (Otte and Chilonda 2002). The 
farmers reported that approximately 20% of cattle were infected with AAT and that every 
fourth infected animal did not effectively respond to trypanocidal treatment. In other words, 
25% of the infected animals showed signs of trypanocide resistance. However, the fatality 
rate was less than 10%. 
In addition, the AAT management statistics indicate that every second farmer treated his 
animals without veterinary support. Further, approximately 75% of the farmers 
administered curative drugs upon the emergence of disease symptoms, whereas 
approximately 30% applied preventive drugs. Although preventive treatment is relatively 
low, the reported treatment failure rate is almost 10% higher than the curative treatment 
failure rate. One explanation for this result might be that preventive treatment strategies 
involve frequent application of the drugs at fixed intervals, which increases the potential for 
misuse or misapplication. 
Finally, the average estimated risk and time preferences indicate that the farmers were risk-
averse and that they had relatively low discount rates (Liebenehm and Waibel 2014). On 
average, the farmers assumed that the probability that their animals would be infected with 
AAT is approximately 30%, whereas the joint probability of a sensitive infection was 
16.64%, and the joint probability of a resistant infection was 12.5%. 
Some of the observed statistics will serve as inputs for the bio-economic model, which will 
be introduced in the following section. 
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3.3 A bio-economic model of African animal trypanosomosis 
We use bio-economic modeling to analyze optimal drug control of AAT under the risk of 
drug resistance development. Figure 3.1 illustrates our bio-economic model, which consists 
of (i) a biological component that simulates the transmission of the disease and the impact 
of curative and preventive treatment intervention while allowing for the evolution of drug 
resistance and (ii) an economic component that identifies the optimal allocation of curative 
and preventive treatments that minimizes the value of total losses from AAT. In the 
following, we detail the two model components. 
 
3.3.1 Biological component 
The first component (Figure 3.1a), i.e., the biological-epidemiological component, 
simulates the transmission of AAT from vector to host, and vice versa, and the impact of 
two alternative drug treatment strategies.  
 
Rogers (1988) and Milligan and Baker (1988) develop mathematical models of tsetse-
transmitted trypanosomosis, where the transmission of trypanosomosis is a function of the 
tsetse feeding rate, proportion of infected tsetse, tsetse-host ratio, and probability of an 
infective bite causing infection in the host. In addition, they assume constant populations 
and consider multiple host tsetse and trypanosome species. Milligan and Baker (1988) 
specify a SEIR compartmental model, where the host population is differentiated by health 
states. For example, a healthy animal moves from the susceptible state (S) to the exposed 
state (E) if it is bitten by an infected fly. After incubation, the host moves to the infectious 
state (I), and finally, through natural recovery, the infection is cleared, and the removed 
state is reached (R). 
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Figure 3.1 Bio-economic model of AAT control  
Source: Own illustration 
 
In this study, we adopt the modeling strategy developed by Milligan and Baker (1988). As 
in their paper, we assume constant host and vector populations and therefore set death rates 
equal to birth rates.  
However, we make the following adjustments. We simplify the model and consider only 
one host species (domestic cattle), one tsetse species (G. m. morsitans), and one 
trypanosome species (T. congolense). Further, we ignore the exposed state and allow 
individual cattle to move between susceptible (S), infected (I), and removed (R) classes in 
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the host population and between susceptible (SV) and infected (IV) classes in the tsetse 
population.1 We extend the Milligan and Baker (1988) model by allowing for the 
development of drug resistance through treatment failure. Figure 3.2 illustrates the basic 
specification of the AAT model. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Schematic illustration of basic AAT model without treatment 
Source: Own illustration 
 
                                                          
1
 For all variables with subscript H and V, let subscript H = host and subscript V = vector. 
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To incorporate the possibility of drug resistance development into the model, we divide the 
infected host population (I) into animals infected with drug-sensitive AAT strains (IS) and 
animals infected with drug-resistant AAT strains (IR). We let a proportion ϕ of hosts be 
infected with drug-sensitive AAT strains and (1-ϕ) hosts be infected with drug-resistant 
AAT strains. In addition, we allow for drug resistance development due to a treatment 
failure at rate ε. We assume that an incorrect administration of the drug by a cattle farmer 
reduces the effectiveness of the drug and causes the AAT pathogen to become drug 
resistant. Because of drug misuse, hosts infected with drug-sensitive AAT strains, for 
which treatment should have been effective, progress to a resistant infection class (IR), 
where treatment is no longer effective (Tumwiine, Hove-Musekwa, and Nyabadza 2014).  
 
The transmission of AAT is caused by an interaction between vectors and hosts. 
Susceptible hosts (S) are infected by infected tsetse (IV) at the force of infection in hosts 
(βH): 
(1) HVHH NSI /  , 
where δ is the daily biting rate of tsetse, πH indicates the probability that an infected bite 
infects susceptible host, and NH is the total host population (NH=S+IS+IR+R). Infected 
hosts either die from AAT at a death rate αH or naturally lose parasitaemia at a constant rate 
γ. In the latter case, the host develops some temporary immunity against AAT, and infected 
hosts move to the removed class (R). As drug-resistant trypanosomes are likely to be less fit 
than their non-drug-resistant counterparts, we assume that drug-resistant infections are 
cleared at a faster rate than sensitive infections (Van den Bossche et al. 2006). However, as 
cattle infected with drug-resistant strains are unable to be treated, they are more likely to 
die than cattle infected with drug-sensitive strains. Finally, temporary immunity decreases 
by a rate θ, and immune hosts again become susceptible to AAT. 
 
Susceptible tsetse flies (SV) become infected by biting an infected host that is infected with 
either a sensitive or a resistant AAT strain (IS+IR). We specify the force of infection in 
tsetse (βV) as follows:  
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(2) HRSVVV NIIS /)(   , 
where πV indicates the probability that a bite infects susceptible tsetse. We further assume 
that once flies are infected, they remain infected (Milligan and Baker 1988). 
 
Having defined our basic model of AAT transmission, we incorporate curative and 
preventive drug treatment in a next step.  
In general, we assume that curative treatment is administered only to AAT-infected animals 
and that only susceptible animals are treated with preventive drugs. In both cases, we allow 
resistance to evolve through inappropriate use of drugs. In particular, we make the 
following adjustments to our basic model. 
 
First, we distinguish between the possibilities of resistance development to curative drugs 
and resistance development to preventive drugs. Therefore, we split the host population that 
is infected with drug-resistant AAT strains (IR) into a population of animals that are 
infected with AAT strains that are resistant to curative drugs (IRu) and a population of 
animals that are infected with AAT strains that are resistant to preventive drugs (IRq). The 
parameter ϕ is adjusted accordingly, i.e., a fraction ϕ1 of hosts are infected with drug-
sensitive AAT strains, ϕ2 hosts are infected with curative drug-resistant AAT strains, and 
(1-ϕ1- ϕ2) hosts are infected with preventive drug-resistant AAT strains. 
In the case of curative drug treatment, we assume that the drug that is administered to 
infected animals clears the drug-sensitive AAT infection at rate u and that these animals 
return to the susceptible class (S). If the curative drug is incorrectly applied to infected 
cattle (at treatment failure rate εu), the treatment is ineffective, and animals progress to the 
curative drug-resistant infection class (IRu) (Tumwiine et al. 2014). 
 
Second, to analyze the effect of preventive drug treatment, we incorporate an additional 
class into our host population model, i.e., the class of hosts under prophylaxis prevention 
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(P). Preventive drugs administered to susceptible animals at rate q prevent AAT infection 
in these animals, and these animals progress to the prevented class (P). However, 
prophylaxis treatment does not guarantee the prevention of AAT infection but offers a 
degree of protection indicated by the parameter ψ. The degree of protection varies between 
0 and 1, where ψ=0 suggests no protection and treated animals return to the susceptible 
class and ψ=1 implies full protection. Additionally, the effect of protection diminishes over 
time at rate χ, and infection can no longer be prevented (Milligan and Baker 1988; 
Nyabadza 2008). We further assume that the misuse of prophylactic treatment reduces the 
degree of protection and causes infection in the host. Therefore, AAT pathogens develop 
resistance and mistreated animals move from the sensitive infection class (IS) to the 
preventive drug-resistant infection class (IRq) at rate εq.  
Based on the specifications of AAT transmission and treatments described above, we can 
derive the following coupled system of nonlinear differential equations for hosts: 
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and the following system of nonlinear differential equations for vectors:  
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Table 3.2 presents all the baseline values of the parameters specified in the biological 
component of our bio-economic model.  
  
 53 
Table 3.2 Parameters and baseline values used in the biological component 
Parameter Description Value Reference 
Host: Domestic cattle 
πH 
Probability that a bite infects 
susceptible hosts 
0.025 
McDermott and Coleman 
(2001) 
ϕ1 
Fraction infected with 
sensitive strains 
variable Own survey (2011) 
ϕ2 
Fraction infected with 
curative drug-resistant strains 
variable Own survey (2011) 
γS 
Rate at which hosts infected 
with sensitive strains acquire 
immunity 
1/100 Rogers (1988) 
γR 
Rate at which hosts infected 
with resistant strains acquire 
immunity 
γS < γR Van den Bossche et al. (2006) 
θ Rate of loss of immunity  1/100 Rogers (1988) 
µH Natural death rate 0.0005 Milligan and Baker (1988) 
αH Death rate due to AAT 0.002 Milligan and Baker (1988) 
Vector: Tsetse (G. m. morsitans) 
πV 
Probability that a bite infects 
susceptible tsetse 
0.46 
McDermott and Coleman 
(2001) 
δ Feeding rate  1/3 Hargrove (2003) 
µV Natural death rate 0.03 
Rogers (1988); Milligan and 
Baker (1988) 
Treatment 
εu 
Rate of evolution of drug 
resistance due to curative 
drug misuse 
variable Own survey (2011) 
εq 
Rate of evolution of drug 
resistance due to preventive 
drug misuse 
variable Own survey (2011) 
ψ Degree of protection 10   Nyabadza (2008) 
χ Rate of loss of prophylaxis 0.017 Milligan and Baker (1988) 
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To complete our bio-economic model, we include the economic component as described in 
the next section.  
 
3.3.2 Economic component 
The economic component (Figure 3.1b) identifies the economically optimal allocation of 
curative and preventive treatment of AAT. Gersovitz and Hammer (2005) provide an 
economic framework for the optimal implementation of therapeutic and prophylactic 
treatment of vector-borne diseases. We use their framework and adjust it to our case of 
AAT. 
We aim to identify the optimal treatment allocation that minimizes the present discounted 
value of total losses from AAT. McInerney (1996) suggests that total losses from livestock 
diseases, such as AAT, include losses in the production system that arise from the direct 
effects of the disease (e.g., reduction in output production, death of animals) and 
expenditures for disease control and prevention. 
In the case of AAT in cattle, we define losses in terms of forgone milk and meat production 
and consider expenditures for curative and preventive drug control against AAT. We obtain 
the following objective function: 
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To achieve the private minimum of the present discounted value (v) of total losses (L) from 
AAT subject to the underlying disease dynamics specified in equations (3) – (10), we apply 
cumulative prospect theory to define a utility function for losses as follows: 
(12) 
 )()( LLv  , 
where the parameter ω reflects the degree of loss aversion and the parameter σ can be 
interpreted as a proxy for risk aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). In addition, the 
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parameter A reflects the current money costs of being infected with either type of infection 
(Is, IRu or IRq), b and c are the respective prices of curative treatment rate u and preventive 
treatment rate q, and r is the rate of time preference. Both treatment rates are quadratic 
terms to reflect nonlinear treatment behavior and are bounded to a maximum of 90% 
animal coverage (Lenhart and Workman 2007; Brown and White 2011). 
To minimize the present discounted value of total losses from AAT, we derive the current-
value Hamiltonian, Hc, which consists of the current-value of losses and the change in 
losses that depend on changes in state variables over time valued at respective shadow 
prices λ. We can write the current-value Hamiltonian as follows: 
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From the Hamiltonian, we derive the following necessary conditions for an optimal control 
allocation that minimizes total losses from AAT: 
 
(14) 
bv
I
tu
u
H Sc
2'
)(
)(*0 13
 



     for curative drugs and 
(15) 
cv
S
tq
q
Hc
2'
)(
)(*0 21
 



        for preventive drugs. 
 56 
Finally, we derive the dynamic equations for the multipliers, which can be specified as 
follows: 
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We solve the optimal control problem by using the Forward-Backward Sweep Method, as 
suggested by Lenhart and Workman (2007). The corresponding procedure is written in 
Matlab R2013b.  
In the following, we calibrate the model for the baseline scenario. We then outline 
alternative scenarios and recalibrate the model in order to determine the costs of particular 
strategies and treatment decisions. 
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3.4 Model calibration 
We first calibrate our bio-economic model by using the observed data from our specific 
study area and determine the optimal allocation of curative and preventive treatment against 
AAT. This specification serves as the baseline scenario. In addition, we explore optimal 
AAT control under different scenarios. In particular, we investigate the benefit of optimal 
control in terms of the avoidance of losses relative to the observed mix of treatment 
strategies, the improvement of disease management, and changes in risk and time 
preferences. 
 
3.4.1 Baseline scenario 
In the baseline scenario, we use the observed data from the 202 small-scale cattle farmers 
described in Table 3.1 and the parameter specifications provided in Table 3.2.  
In particular, we use reported numbers of AAT-infected animals and subjective 
probabilities to estimate initial values in the respective states of health, i.e., S = 2884, P = 0, 
Is = 638, IRu = 245, IRq = 245, R = 15. The ratio of animals that were infected with AAT and 
that did not respond to treatment to the number of animals that were infected with AAT 
provides an indication of the proportion of cattle that were infected with sensitive and 
resistant strains, i.e., ϕ1 = 0.74 and ϕ2 = ϕ3 = 0.13. In addition, we use the reported treatment 
failure rates as an indication of the rate of drug resistance development due to drug misuse, 
i.e., εu = 0.184 and εq = 0.273. 
Furthermore, we assume that the initial number of susceptible tsetse flies is 5,000 and that 
2% of susceptible flies are infected with AAT (Rogers 1988).  
Following Kristjanson et al. (1999), we set the costs of infection A at US$34.1 in 
purchasing power parity ($PPP-2005) per head of infected cattle for forgone milk and meat 
production. Because preventive drug treatment must be applied on a regular basis, we 
assume higher costs for preventive control than for curative control. Therefore, we assume 
US$3.65 ($PPP) per head treated with preventive drugs and US$1.22 ($PPP) per head 
treated with curative drugs (Kristjanson et al. 1999).  
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Finally, we use the elicited behavioral parameters obtained by Liebenehm and Waibel 
(2014) to specify the utility function and the discount rate. We assume that the average 
risk-averse, patient farmer optimizes the allocation of curative and preventive control by 
minimizing the total losses from AAT over a finite horizon of 20 years. 
We compare the baseline scenario to the hypothetical scenarios that we introduce in the 
following sections.  
 
3.4.2 Optimal treatment strategy vs. observed treatment strategy 
In the first scenario, we aim to assess the present discounted value of losses due to AAT for 
the optimal mix of treatment strategies compared with the observed mix of treatment 
strategies.  
To obtain a valid estimate of the total observed losses, we assume that the number of AAT 
infections as reported in Table 3.1 remains constant over the total horizon of 20 years. We 
evaluate each infection with the costs of infection in terms of losses in milk and meat 
production (A = US$34.1). 
We then calculate the losses avoided through optimal control relative to observed control. 
We expect that the observed mix of treatment strategies is non-optimal and that the 
potential to avoid losses through optimization is high.  
 
3.4.3 Improved treatment practices vs. observed treatment practices 
In a second scenario, we aim to identify the benefits of adequate disease management 
practices. Therefore, we create a hypothetical scenario in which farmers avoid every second 
treatment failure that was actually observed. In other words, we decrease the treatment 
failure rates by half, i.e., εu = 0.092 and εq = 0.1365, which decreases the number of animals 
that move to the two resistant infection classes IRu and IRq. 
Finally, we compare the baseline scenario of observed treatment failures reported in Table 
3.1 with the hypothetical scenario of reduced treatment failures to determine the losses 
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avoided through improved disease management. We expect that the reduction of treatment 
failures increases the potential cost savings. 
 
3.4.4 Changes in risk and time preferences 
Liebenehm and Waibel (2014) report that cattle farmers in our study area are, on average, 
risk-averse and patient. In a third scenario, we aim to investigate the impact of changes in 
farmers’ risk and time preferences. Therefore, we define two hypothetical scenarios.  
In the first scenario, we change farmers’ average time preference and increase the discount 
rate to 20%. By comparing this case with the baseline, we can analyze changes in optimal 
treatment rates under the assumption that farmers change from being risk-averse and patient 
to being risk-averse and impatient. We expect that a risk-averse farmer with a shorter time 
horizon is likely to have a greater preference for curative treatment over preventive 
treatment than a risk-averse farmer with a longer time horizon. 
 
In the second scenario, we aim to investigate how the optimal treatment rates would change 
if farmers were less risk-averse. Hence, we increase the risk aversion parameter above 0.5 
(σ = 0.6) and decrease the loss aversion parameter below one (ω = 0.8), and we assume that 
the average farmer is risk-taking and patient. Consequently, we expect risk-taking farmers 
with a long time horizon to exhibit a higher preventive treatment rate than risk-averse 
farmers with a long time horizon. 
In the next section, we present the results. 
 
3.5 Results 
We first demonstrate the performance of our bio-economic model without treatment 
interventions given the observed values of our underlying sample in Table 3.1 and the 
parameter specifications in Table 3.2. In a next step, we include curative and preventive 
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drug control and identify the optimal treatment mix. In addition, we investigate the change 
in optimal treatment rates given the scenarios described above. 
 
3.5.1 Basic AAT model without control 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the state variables’ paths to the steady state for both hosts and vectors 
without intervention.  
 
Figure 3.3 Steady states of hosts and vectors without control 
Source: Own illustration 
 
The movement of the state variables toward the steady state is straightforward. The number 
of cattle that are susceptible decreases monotonically, whereas the number of sensitive 
infected animals increases monotonically by approximately 20% to a maximum of 750 
animals in the first year. The number of cattle in the recovered state follows the course of 
the sensitive infected state variable with a slight delay. 
After the maximum infection rate is reached, the number of sensitive infected cattle 
decreases until the steady state is achieved in year five. The number of animals in the two 
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resistant infection classes decreases monotonically because we exclude treatment 
interventions; hence, we have no incidence of treatment failure. The average overall 
prevalence of AAT in cattle is approximately 20%.  
 
The course of vector state variables is consistent with the movements in the cattle 
population. While the number of susceptible tsetse flies is decreasing, the number of 
infected flies is increasing, reaching the steady state at an average prevalence of 
approximately 40%. In their model, Milligan and Baker (1988) report similar fluctuations 
in the prevalence rates of AAT in cattle and tsetse flies. In addition, our simulated 
prevalence in hosts is similar to the observed prevalence reported by farmers (Table 3.1). 
Therefore, we are confident that our model can simulate valid results.  
 
3.5.2 Basic AAT model with optimal curative and preventive control 
In a next step, we include curative and preventive drug treatment and identify the private 
optimal control allocation that minimizes the disutility of total losses from AAT (Figure 
3.4). 
We can describe the course of the optimal curative and preventive control allocation over 
the finite horizon of 20 years as follows:  
In the initial period, it seems optimal to treat approximately 12.5% of AAT-infected 
animals with curative drugs and to apply prophylaxis to 28% of animals that are susceptible 
to AAT. Consequently, the number of animals that are infected with drug-sensitive strains 
is decreasing through therapeutic intervention, and preventive drug control moves 
susceptible animals to the protected class.  
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Figure 3.4 Number of animals in different states of health and optimal treatment rates 
Source: Own illustration 
 
After the initial period, the curative treatment rate monotonically decreases until year ten 
with the declining number of sensitive infected animals. Simultaneously, the preventative 
treatment rate is increasing leading to a monotonic increase in the number of animals that 
are protected from AAT infection. 
The increase in the protected cattle population reaches a turning point when the preventive 
treatment rate is at its maximum of approximately 32%. After the maximum is reached, the 
preventive treatment rate decreases, slowing down the increase in the number of protected 
animals. While the preventive treatment rate decreases, the curative treatment rate remains 
constant at a relatively low level. 
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The slopes of the number of animals in the two resistant classes marginally decrease over 
time because the treatment is not effective and because mortality from AAT is high. 
However, the number of animals infected with AAT strains that are resistant to preventive 
drugs is slightly higher than the number of animals infected with AAT strains that are 
resistant to curative drugs because we observe a higher treatment failure rate for preventive 
AAT control. 
 
However, for our risk-averse, patient cattle farmers, the privately optimal mix of treatment 
strategies involves applying a preventative treatment strategy until a maximum number of 
susceptible cattle are protected from the risk of AAT infection and supporting this 
preventive treatment with a small number of curative treatments for infected cattle. 
 
3.5.3 Optimal treatment strategy vs. observed treatment strategy 
To better assess the value of this result, we compare the losses due to AAT for optimal 
treatment allocation with the observed total losses. We plot the benefit of optimal control in 
terms of avoided losses in Figure 3.5.  
In the first year, the costs of AAT are higher in the optimal control scenario than in the 
observed case. The higher costs of AAT with optimal control during the initial period result 
from the higher treatment rates, particularly higher preventive treatment, and the lagged 
treatment impact. 
However, after the initial period, optimal AAT control can avoid losses in two ways. First, 
curative control clears sensitive AAT infections and reduces the number of infected 
animals, which saves meat and milk production losses. Simultaneously, preventive control 
protects animals from new infections and hence prevents potential losses. The maximum 
benefit is reached in year two when the majority of sensitive infections are treated 
successfully and when a large number of animals are protected. 
Across the remaining horizon of 20 years, the total disease losses with optimal control 
remain below the total disease losses without optimal control. On average, the private 
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benefit of optimal control in terms of avoided losses is US$125 per year, which 
corresponds to 5% of the annual income from cattle production. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Avoided losses through optimal control 
Source: Own illustration 
 
In the next section, we investigate the optimal allocation of curative and preventive control 
from different behavioral perspectives. 
 
3.5.4 Improved treatment practices vs. observed treatment practices 
In the next scenario, we aim to assess treatment practices in terms of avoided treatment 
failures. Therefore, we compare optimal treatment rates between the baseline scenario and 
the hypothetical scenario, where the incidence of every second treatment failure is avoided 
(Figure 3.6).  
Figure 3.6 indicates that less treatment failure is associated with lower treatment rates. In 
particular, a high treatment failure rate that leads to drug resistance requires more 
prophylaxis. In other words, good treatment practices contain the benefit of saving 
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expenditures for preventive control. If an average West African cattle farmer avoided every 
second treatment failure, he would save approximately US$128 per year. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Avoided losses through improved treatment practice 
Source: Own illustration 
 
 
3.5.5 Changes in risk and time preferences 
Having identified the impact of improved treatment practices, we investigate the role of 
behavioral attitudes such as risk and time preferences in a next step.  
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Figure 3.7 Treatment rates and total losses under different behavioral attitudes 
Source: Own illustration 
 
Figure 3.7 compares the optimal curative and preventive treatment rates between the 
baseline and hypothetical scenarios of higher discount rates and risk-taking behavior.  
Under the assumption that farmers are as risk-averse as they were observed to be but more 
impatient, both the curative and the preventive treatment rates increase. Impatience is 
associated with a high curative treatment rate of infected animals for a short horizon in the 
beginning of the horizon and a preventive treatment rate of approximately 45% of 
susceptible animals across the total horizon. 
In contrast, if we assume that farmers would be less risk-averse, the optimal preventive 
treatment rate is larger than 80% in the initial period but decreases over time below the 
optimal preventive treatment rate of risk-averse farmers. The optimal course of curative 
treatment is similar to that of risk-averse farmers. However, the initially high curative 
treatment rate of risk-taking farmers persists over a longer horizon, crosses the line of risk-
averse farmers, and remains below this line. Therefore, risk-taking and patient behavior is 
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linked to high initial investments, especially in preventive treatment, that will save 
treatment expenditures in the future.  
Consequently, risk-taking and patient behavior that is associated with a higher preventive 
treatment rate during the first years requires more investments in treatment and hence 
higher costs. However, after the two years, risk-taking and patient behavior reduces total 
losses the most. Under the assumption that the average farmer is less risk-averse, he would 
annually save approximately US$130. 
 
3.6 Summary and conclusions 
This paper aimed to identify the privately optimal allocation of curative and preventive 
drug control that minimizes the present discounted value of total disease losses from AAT 
given the risk of resistance development through trypanocide misuse. 
To achieve our objective, we developed a bio-economic model in which the biological 
component simulates the transmission of AAT from vector to host and the economic 
component identifies the economically optimal allocation of curative and preventive 
treatment against AAT.  
We used the observed epidemiological and socio-economic characteristics of 202 cattle 
farmers living in remote areas of Mali and Burkina Faso. In particular, we were able to 
mimic farmers’ behavioral characteristics with available experimental data on their risk and 
time preferences. We are confident that our model realistically simulates AAT transmission 
because we obtain prevalence rates that are similar to the observed prevalence in the study 
area. 
We found that the optimal allocation of disease control resources for an average farmer 
who is risk-averse and patient involves applying a preventive treatment strategy until a 
maximum number of susceptible cattle are protected from the risk of AAT infection. In 
addition, this preventive treatment should be supported with a small number of curative 
treatments for infected cattle. Compared to observed practices, adopting the optimal 
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strategy would save each farmer US$125 annually, which corresponds to 5% of the annual 
income from cattle production. 
We also demonstrated that improvements in AAT treatment practices have the potential to 
save losses. If farmers could reduce treatment failure by 50%, the development of drug 
resistance would be delayed, and drugs would remain effective for a longer period. 
Reducing the number of resistant infections alone corresponds to approximately US$128 in 
avoided losses per average herd. 
Finally, we found that risk-averse and patient behavior as observed in the study area is 
associated with high disease losses. If education programs could be developed that are 
effective in changing farmers’ behavior, e.g., livestock farmer field schools (Braun et al. 
2006), and reduce risk aversion, such programs would generate annual benefits of 
approximately US$130 per farmer. 
 
Our results are useful for developing targeted policy interventions that can generate 
incentives to optimize current treatment against AAT. For example, livestock field schools 
could provide special training in drug management to reduce treatment failures and the risk 
of drug resistance development (Grace et al. 2008). Other interventions might include 
treatment subsidies to encourage farmers to make higher investments in prophylaxis in 
order to reduce the probability of infection. 
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CHAPTER 4:  CHANGES IN RISK ATTITUDES AND VULNERABILITY TO 
IDIOSYNCRATIC AND COVARIATE SHOCKS - EVIDENCE 
FROM PANEL HOUSEHOLD DATA IN THAILAND AND 
VIETNAM 
 
This chapter is a modified version of 
“Changes in Risk Attitudes and Vulnerability to Poverty – Evidence from Panel Household 
Data In Thailand and Vietnam.” Paper presented at the PEGNet Conference 2014, 
September 18-19, Lusaka, Zambia and at Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer (AEL) of 
Verein für Socialpolitik Conference, June 27-28, Passau, Germany. 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we aim to explain temporal variation in individual risk attitudes by an 
exogenous measure of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. We estimate the impact of 
idiosyncratic and covariate shocks in terms of variation in consumption, at the individual 
and at the aggregate level, using multilevel modeling. The empirical basis for our analysis 
is a panel data set of 2812 respondents from rural Thailand and Vietnam that was collected 
in 2008 and 2010.  
We find that on average, risk attitudes change over time in Thailand and Vietnam. In 
addition, we show that idiosyncratic shocks trigger changes in risk attitudes of respondents 
from Thailand, whereas covariate shocks affect risk attitudes of respondents from Vietnam. 
The impact is also different for poor and non-poor respondents. The results suggest the 
existence of a negative feedback loop, where shocks increase poor individuals’ risk 
aversion and consequently their likelihood of remaining in poverty.  
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We conclude that respondents living in persistent poverty in Vietnam perform better in 
insuring idiosyncratic shocks through risk-sharing and safety nets. In Thailand, such mutual 
insurance mechanisms across individuals are not likely to perform well. 
 
 
Keywords: Idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, multilevel modeling, risk attitude, 
Thailand, Vietnam, vulnerability 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Negative shocks can destroy assets and reduce income. Particularly in developing countries 
where people are constrained in liquidity and in assets, negative shocks can keep them 
below the poverty line or push them deeper into poverty – sometimes resulting in poverty 
traps (Barrett and Carter 2013). In this context, risk attitudes play an important role 
(Mosley and Verschoor 2005). If negative shocks increase risk aversion this would cause a 
doubly negative effect as poor and risk-averse people are likely to invest in low-risk, low 
return activities and stay poor (Morduch 1994; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Dercon 
1996; Mosley and Verschoor 2005; Naschold 2012) 
 
In this paper we examine if shocks affect human behavior in such a way as to change her 
willingness to take risk? And if so, to what extent? 
We argue in this paper, that there are events that may change human’s risk attitudes over 
time. Such events can appear at two different levels, i.e. (i) idiosyncratic shocks at the 
individual level such as sudden unemployment or illness, and (ii) covariate shocks at the 
aggregate level that affect an accumulation of individuals such as natural disasters or an 
economic crisis. 
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Long-term panel studies that investigated the impact of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks 
on individual risk attitudes have one common conclusion, namely: idiosyncratic shocks 
show no significant impact on risk attitudes, while covariate shocks show a significant 
impact on risk attitudes (Andersen et al. 2008; Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008; Doss, 
McPeak, and Barrett 2008; Malmendier and Nagel 2011; Cassar, Healy, and Kessler 2011; 
Voors et al. 2012; Sahm 2012; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2013; Willinger, Bchir, and 
Heitz 2013; Callen et al. 2014; Hanaoka, Shigeoka, and Watanabe 2014) 
 
In this paper we aim to test if this pattern is true for rural Thailand and Vietnam. Gloede, 
Menkhoff and Waibel (2013) investigated the correlation between self-reported 
idiosyncratic and covariate shocks and risk attitudes using data from more than 4000 
households from rural Thailand and Vietnam collected in 2010. In their cross-sectional 
study, they find that idiosyncratic shocks are correlated with larger risk aversion in 
Vietnam, whereas covariate shocks are associated with larger risk aversion in Thailand. 
However, we enhance Gloede et al.’s (2013) study in several ways.  
First we use a panel data set of 2812 identical household heads from rural Thailand (1431) 
and Vietnam (1381) and analyze the impact of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks on 
changes in individual risk attitudes from 2008 to 2010. Second, we do not use self-reported 
shocks, because we argue that individual perceptions and emotions strongly influence the 
propensity to report a shock by the respondent. For example, a risk-averse respondent will 
perceive a shock in a different way than a risk-taking respondent and may report more 
shocks1. The explanation of risk attitudes by self-reported shocks would then be biased. We 
use a more objective measure of shock experienced. We assume that the impact of a shock 
is reflected in variation of consumption. Therefore, we estimate the variation in 
consumption using Günther and Harttgen’s (2009) concept of vulnerability to idiosyncratic 
and covariate shocks. Third, we apply multilevel modeling in order to distinguish between 
the impact of idiosyncratic shocks and covariate shocks over time. In particular, we 
estimate the variation in consumption at the individual level and at the community level as 
proxies for idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. In the next step, we use the proxies to 
                                                          
1
 In our data set we find a correlation between risk aversion and number of shocks reported of 0.368. 
 76 
explain changes in risk attitudes over time. Finally, we examine if the estimated impact of 
shocks on changes in risk attitudes is different between poor and non-poor individuals. 
 
Our main findings are that, first, risk attitudes significantly change over time both in 
Thailand and Vietnam. Second, we find that idiosyncratic shocks affect risk attitudes of 
respondents in Thailand, whereas covariate shocks influence risk attitudes of respondents in 
Vietnam. Third, in both countries, risk attitudes of transient poor individuals are affected by 
both kinds of shocks. Hence, our results indicate the existence of a negative feedback loop, 
where shocks increase poor individuals’ risk aversion and consequently their likelihood of 
remaining in poverty (Morduch 1994; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Dercon 1996; 
Mosley and Verschoor 2005; Naschold 2012). Fourth, mutual insurance mechanisms 
against idiosyncratic shocks such as risk-sharing or safety nets are likely to perform well 
across chronically poor individuals in Vietnam. However, these mechanisms seem to be 
less effective in Thailand. 
 
Our finding that idiosyncratic shocks increase risk aversion in Thailand and covariate 
shocks increase risk aversion in Vietnam does not confirm the results of Gloede et al. 
(2013) that use cross-sectional data and self-reported shocks. However, we believe that our 
approach is more precise as we use panel data of identical decision-makers and measure 
shock impacts in terms of variation in consumption.  
The country-specific difference in the kind of shocks that affect risk attitudes in Thailand 
and Vietnam can be possibly explained by political differences. Until 2011 public 
investments into social protection schemes by the Thai government leaves the majority of 
small-scale farmers in rural areas uncovered (Schmitt, Sakunphanit, and Prasitsiriphol 
2013). Vietnam has seen extensive public investments in social protection in the last ten 
years targeting vulnerable groups, which might lead to the reduction of idiosyncratic risks, 
but is not effective to reduce covariate risks (Bonnet et al. 2012; Cuong, Tung, and 
Westbrook 2014). 
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Comparing our findings with those from the recent literature that apply longitudinal data 
from developing countries, we can identify similarities and differences. Our result that risk 
attitudes are time-variant in Thailand and Vietnam corresponds to other long-term panel 
studies in rural areas of Southeast Asia. Respondents from rural areas that experienced 
natural hazards like the tsunami in Thailand in 2004 (Cassar et al. 2011) or the volcano 
outbreak in central Java in 2010 (Willinger et al. 2013) showed significant changes in risk 
attitudes. Our result that covariate shocks affect risk attitudes in Vietnam is therefore 
consistent with these studies. However, our finding that idiosyncratic shocks alter risk 
attitudes in Thailand contradicts findings from East Africa, where the impact of shocks at 
the individual level on farmers’ risk attitudes was found to be less important than the 
impact of covariate shocks (Doss et al. 2008). 
 
In the next section, we review the literature and develop our conceptual framework, which 
is followed by a description of the data. The empirical strategy is introduced in section four. 
In section five we present the results and finally in section six we draw conclusions. 
 
4.2 Conceptual framework 
In the literature on time-variant risk attitudes we find two strands. On the one hand, there 
are studies that find that risk attitudes are a stable function of time. However, all these 
studies were conducted with respondents, mostly students interrogated in a laboratory 
experimental set up, from developed countries using small sample sizes and short time 
horizons (Love and Robison 1984; Schoemaker and Hershey 1992; Smidts 1997; Harrison 
et al. 2005; Vlaev, Chater, and Stewart 2009; Lönnqvist et al. 2014; Wölbert and Riedl 
2013). 
 
On the other hand, there are studies that investigate the causality between shocks and risk 
attitudes by means of long-term panel data. These studies have one common conclusion, 
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i.e. idiosyncratic shocks at the individual level show no significant impact on risk attitudes, 
while covariate shocks at the aggregate level show a significant impact on risk attitudes. 
Long-term panel studies that cover large samples of respondents from the US over ten 
years (Sahm 2012) and over 20 years (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008) find that 
idiosyncratic shocks like unemployment, health shocks, or changes in income, assets or 
wealth do not affect the stability of risk attitudes over time. Empirical evidence from East 
Africa also suggests that the influence of idiosyncratic shocks is small (Doss et al. 2008). 
In contrast, long-term panel studies which measure covariate shocks at an aggregated level 
such as economic shocks (Andersen et al. 2008; Malmendier and Nagel 2011; Sahm 2012; 
Guiso et al. 2013), social shocks (Voors et al. 2012; Callen et al. 2014), and natural 
disasters (Cassar et al. 2011; Willinger et al. 2013; Hanaoka et al. 2014) are found to alter 
risk attitudes over time. For example, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and Sahm (2012) find 
a significant impact of macro-economic shocks on risk attitudes of US citizens over time. 
Guiso et al. (2013) investigates the change in risk attitudes of Italian investors following the 
2008 financial crisis. The literature on social shocks showed that risk attitudes change over 
time if people are exposed to violent conflicts and war. This has been shown by Voors et al. 
(2012) in rural Burundi and by Callen et al. (2014) in Afghanistan. Panel studies that 
investigate the impact of natural disasters, like the 2004 tsunami in Thailand (Cassar et al. 
2011), the eruption of a volcano in Java (Willinger et al. 2013) or the great East Japan 
earthquake (Hanaoka et al. 2014), also find a significant impact on individual risk attitudes 
over time.  
 
One possible explanation for this commonly observed phenomenon that covariate shocks 
matter, but idiosyncratic shocks do not matter, may be that insurance of consumption 
against idiosyncratic shocks is better than against covariate shocks. Mutual insurance 
mechanisms within a community are more likely to decrease idiosyncratic shock impacts, 
because they are by definition not correlated across individual households (Ray 1998). 
Another explanation may be collective fear. Guiso et al. (2013) suggest that large-scale 
negative shocks may create a state of collective fear, where individuals are likely to adopt 
fear of the group and thereby lead to an increase in risk aversion.  
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In this paper we aim to investigate if this common pattern that covariate shocks alter risk 
attitudes over time, but idiosyncratic shocks show no influence, can also be observed in 
rural Thailand and Vietnam and if the impact of shocks is different between poor and non-
poor respondents.  
Our analysis aims to explain temporal variation in individual risk attitudes by an exogenous 
measure of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Therefore, we estimate the variation in 
consumption at the individual level and at the community level following Günther and 
Harttgen’s (2009) approach in order to obtain exogenous measures of idiosyncratic and 
covariate shocks. We use these proxies of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks to explain 
changes in risk attitudes over time. Finally, we aim to investigate if the impact of the shock 
proxies on risk attitudes is different between poor and non-poor respondents. Figure 4.1 
illustrates the steps that we will explain in more detail in the following. 
 
Günther and Harttgen (2009) assume that the impact of a shock is reflected in variation of 
consumption. We follow their approach and apply a hierarchical model structure and 
estimate the impact of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks in terms of variation in 
consumption at the individual and at the aggregate level. In the first step, we estimate 
variation in consumption (Cons) at the individual level and the district level given 
exogenous variables. To model variation in consumption at the individual level we use 
common socio-economic variables often found in the literature such as age, education, 
employment, household size, dependency ratio and land size (Chaudhuri 2003; Günther and 
Harttgen 2009; Imai, Gaiha, and Kang 2011; Azam and Imai 2012). In addition, we include 
ethnicity and war veteran for Vietnam, because we expect that belonging to an ethnic 
minority or having participated in the Vietnam War, play a significant role in individual 
consumption. The variance in consumption at the individual level is then used as a proxy 
for the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on individual consumption. To model variance in 
consumption at the district level we use variables such as geographic location, the number 
of medium-to-large enterprises and district population (Günther and Harttgen 2009; Azam 
and Imai 2012). The variance in consumption at the district level is then used as a proxy for 
the impact of covariate shocks on individual consumption. 
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In the second step we analyze the impact of the estimated shock proxies, at the individual 
and district level, on changes in household head’s willingness to take risk (∆WTR) over 
time. Following the studies that use long-term panel data to investigate changes in risk 
attitudes over time in developing countries (for example Doss et al. 2008; Cassar et al. 2011 
or Willinger et al. 2013), we expect a significant impact of the covariate shock proxy, but 
no significant impact of the idiosyncratic shock proxy on the change in willingness to take 
risk. We also control for other socio-economic, physical and psychological factors that are 
usually used to explain differences in risk attitudes between individuals. For example, 
Dohmen et al. (2011) suggest that gender and height are important characteristics that help 
to explain differences in individual risk attitudes. Women are usually found to be less 
willing to take risk than men, whereas height – used as a proxy for self-confidence – is 
found to be positively associated with risk-taking. Marital status (Sahm 2012) and physical 
fitness (Hanaoka et al. 2014) are also found to play an important role. As being married 
may improve individual’s safety nets, we expect it to be positively related to risk-taking 
behavior. According to Hanaoka et al. (2014) we expect healthiness and general well-being 
to be positively correlated with risk-taking. 
 
Finally, in the third step, we further expand our approach to examine the impact of shocks 
on the risk attitudes of poor and non-poor respondents. We expect that non-poor 
respondents may dispose of enough resources to buffer idiosyncratic shocks and their risk 
attitudes may hence be not affected. However, covariate shocks with deeper and longer 
impacts may alter risk attitudes of non-poor people. In contrast, we expect that poor people 
are more strongly affected by both idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, which in turn may 
alter their risk attitude. 
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Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework 
Source: Own illustration 
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4.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
The data used in this paper come from the project “Impact of Shocks on the Vulnerability 
to Poverty: Consequences for Development of Emerging Southeast Asian Economies”, 
funded by the German Research Foundation (FOR 756). The survey covers 4212 
households that are representative for rural areas in Thailand and Vietnam
2
.  
In this paper we investigate behavior of individuals that are the decision-makers of 
households. Therefore, we consider only respondents that were the head and the decision-
maker inside the household, because we assume that they are responsible for risk 
management. This leads to a final sample of 2812 respondents from 76 districts.  
Comprehensive information is available about the 2812 respondents. We have data on 
socio-economic characteristics of the household and its members, information about 
income generating activities and expenditures as well as information about perceived 
shocks in the past and expected risks in the future. We measure risk attitudes using 
Dohmen et al.’s (2011) survey-based measure, where respondents are asked to classify 
themselves on an eleven-point Likert scale. The survey question reads: “Are you generally 
a person who is fully prepared to take risk or do you try to avoid taking risk? Please choose 
a number on a scale from zero (unwilling to take risk) to ten (fully prepared to take risk)”. 
The survey-based measure is not a perfect measure of risk aversion in that it does not 
reflect risk aversion in concavity of the utility function (Pratt 1966; Arrow 1971). However, 
the survey-based measure has been validated in several countries and several contexts and 
is generally found to be less noisy than experimental measures (Lönnqvist et al. 2014; 
Guiso et al. 2013; Wölbert and Riedl 2013; Chuang and Schechter 2014). Furthermore, 
Hardeweg, Menkhoff and Waibel (2013) validated the survey-based measure by an 
incentive compatible experiment using a sub-sample of the current paper’s sample. In the 
following we define this variable as respondent’s willingness to take risk. 
Table 4.1 presents an overview of individual- and district-specific descriptive statistics of 
the sample. Some of these will be used later as explanatory variables in the analysis. The 
descriptive statistics at the individual level show that the change in willingness to take risk 
                                                          
2
 For more information on sampling please see Hardeweg, Klasen and Waibel (2013). 
 83 
over time was small (a half category), but significant in both countries. On average, 
respondents appeared to be more willing to take risk in 2010 than in 2008. However, Thai 
respondents were in general more willing to take risk than Vietnamese respondents.  
The average respondent from Thailand was approximately 50 years old and had spent five 
years in formal school. The average respondent from Vietnam was approximately two years 
younger than Thai respondents and spent two more years in formal school. In Thailand, 
more than 60% of respondents were female, whereas 45% of respondents in Vietnam were 
female. In both countries, approximately 80% of respondents were married. The percentage 
of socio-political members decreased significantly in Thailand from approximately 10% to 
5%. In contrast, the percentage of socio-politically active respondents in Vietnam remained 
high at 75%. Health and individual well-being in Thailand significantly improved over 
time. In Vietnam, individual well-being improved over time, too, but the percentage of 
respondents who reported that they were sick increased over time. Approximately 20% of 
respondents from Vietnam belonged to an ethnic minority and the same percentage 
experienced the Vietnam War. 
There is a significant increase in income and consumption over time in Thailand, whereas 
income and consumption remained at the same, but lower level, in Vietnam. Consequently, 
the headcount ratio (US$2 consumption poverty line) decreased over time from 12% to 3% 
in Thailand, whereas in Vietnam the share of respondents below the poverty line remained 
at approximately 25%. 
In both countries there was a significant increase in the number of self-reported 
idiosyncratic shocks over time, whereas the number of covariate shocks significantly 
decreased from 2008 to 2010. 
District level characteristics are scaled up from information provided by the village head. 
The average district population for our sample was approximately 29,000 inhabitants in 
Thailand and 46,000 in Vietnam. In both countries, there were approximately eight 
enterprises with more than 9 employees. Approximately 85% of respondents from Thailand 
resided in plain country, 13% lived close to rivers, lakes or sea and 2% stayed in 
mountainous areas. In Vietnam, the majority of respondents lived close to water and in 
mountainous areas. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of mean socio-economic characteristics 
 Thailand  Vietnam  
 2008 2010 2008 2010 
Individual characteristics     
Willingness to take risk (WTR) 4.072 4.572*** 3.58 4.13*** 
Age (years) 51.53 53.55*** 48.17 50.16*** 
Female (%) 60.52 60.52 45.19 45.19 
Height (m) 1.57 1.58 1.58 1.58 
Education (years) 5.17 5.21 7.43 7.41 
Married (%) 79.87 79.87 82.61 82.68 
Member of socio-pol. organization (%) 10.06 5.66*** 75.16 74.86 
Health status     
Can manage (%) 29.35 32.5* 63.58 51.99*** 
Sick (%) 15.09 12.44** 21.51 26.74** 
Present well-being     
Same as last year (%) 39.9 39.27 51.2 42.36*** 
Better than last year (%) 29.91 33.68** 25.27 34.18*** 
Much better than last year (%) 2.31 5.66*** 0.29 0.22 
Minority (%) n.a. n.a. 19.26 19.26 
Vietnam war (%) n.a. n.a. 20.05 20.05 
Household size 3.906 3.859 4.25 4.08** 
Dependency ratio 0.671 0.631** 0.701 0.627*** 
Land size (ha) 1.027 1.027 0.239 0.283 
Income per month ($PPP per capita) 113.65 139.21*** 105.77 101.04 
Consumption per month ($PPP per capita) 121.54 184.61*** 91.41 91.25 
Headcount ratio (2 $PPP poverty line) 0.119 0.036*** 0.253 0.267 
Number of self-reported idiosyncratic shocks 0.465 1.18*** 0.218 1.513*** 
Number of self-reported covariate shocks 0.779 0.64*** 1.214 0.749*** 
District characteristics     
Population N.a. 28,741  46,356 
Number of enterprises > 9 employees N.a. 7.604  8.387 
Location     
Mountain (%) N.a. 2.446 N.a. 56.988 
Close to water (%) N.a. 13.206 N.a. 40.623 
N 1431 1431 1381 1381 
Note: Means are compared by Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. N.a. means not available. Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote p < 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01, respectively. Source: DFG 756 Survey 2008 and 2010; own calculations 
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4.4 Empirical strategy 
In order to appropriately explain changes in individual risk attitudes over time by 
idiosyncratic and covariate shocks we use variation in consumption as a proxy for shocks 
experienced and differentiate between the levels of shock impact. We apply multilevel 
modeling with two levels. Level 1 represents the individual respondent’s level (i) and level 
2 is the district level (j). The chosen levels provide sufficient variation in the dependent 
variable willingness to take risk
3
.  
 
We implement our empirical strategy in three steps. In the first step, we estimate the 
variance in consumption at the individual level and at the community level in order to 
obtain proxies for the impact of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. In the second step, we 
aim to identify if the variation in consumption has an impact on the change in risk attitudes 
over time. Finally, in the third step, we investigate if the impact of shocks on changes in 
risk attitudes is different between poor and non-poor respondents. We describe the 
empirical procedure in more detail in the following. 
 
In order to obtain an objective proxy for shocks in the first step we follow Günther and 
Harttgen’s (2009) concept of vulnerability to idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. We 
estimate the expected idiosyncratic and covariate variance of consumption based on the 
following multilevel household’s consumption equation: 
(1) ijj
P
p
pijpj
P
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Q
q
qjpijpq
Q
q
qjq
P
p
pijpooij euXuZXZXCons   000ln  . 
In equation 1, we regress monthly log consumption per capita of respondent i in district j 
(Consij) on a set of individual characteristics (Xij), a set of district characteristics Zj, and 
individual-district-characteristic interactions (XijZj). We assume that the individual-level 
error term eij captures the impact of idiosyncratic shocks and the community-level error 
                                                          
3
 Approximately 12% of the total variance in willingness to take risk is represented at the district level and 
20% is represented at the individual level, both are above the minimum threshold of 10% (Hox 2010). 
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term u0j captures the impact of covariate shocks. The squared residuals are then regressed 
against a set of individual and district level characteristics. Finally, we estimate the 
expected idiosyncratic variance (
2ˆ
ije
 ) and covariate variance ( 2
0
ˆ
ju
 ) of consumption and 
use them as proxies for idiosyncratic and covariate shocks (Günther & Harttgen 2009).  
 
In the second step, we use these proxies of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks as 
explanatory variables and investigate their impact on the change in willingness to take risk 
over time: 
(2) 
ijtijj
Q
q
qjqu
P
p
pijpeijtooijt euuZXTWTR jij   0
2
010
2
2010 0
ˆˆ  , 
where 
2ˆ
ije
  reflects the impact of idiosyncratic shocks at the individual level and 2
0
ˆ
ju

represents the impact of covariate shocks at the district level. In addition we include other 
explanatory variables Xij at the individual level and other explanatory variables Zj at the 
district level that had been introduced in our conceptual framework.  
 
In the third step, we investigate the impact of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks on risk 
attitudes for different poverty groups, i.e. structural poor, transient poor and non-poor. We 
define chronic poverty as permanent low consumption prospects and transient poverty as 
the contribution of high consumption volatility to expected poverty (Ravallion and Jalan 
1998). In other words, if the estimated mean consumption ( cˆ ) and the estimated total 
standard deviation (
jij ue 0
ˆˆ   ) in consumption lie below the poverty line (z), then the 
respondent is referred to as chronically poor, i.e. 
(3) zcifpoorychronicall
jij ue
 )ˆˆ(ˆ1
0
 , 0 otherwise. 
If the estimated mean consumption is above the poverty line, but a high estimated total 
standard deviation in consumption leads to a drop in consumption below the poverty line or 
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the estimated mean consumption is below the poverty line and the total standard deviation 
leads to a push above the poverty line, then the respondent is categorized as transient poor: 
(4) zcorzcifpoortransient
jijjij ueue
 )ˆˆ(ˆ)ˆˆ(ˆ1
00
 , 0 otherwise. 
Finally, the respondent is classified as non-poor, if mean consumption and the total 
standard deviation in consumption lie above the poverty line (Azam and Imai 2012). 
(5) zcifpoornon
jij ue
 )ˆˆ(ˆ1
0
 , 0 otherwise. 
In the next section we present the results. 
 
4.5 Results 
We aim to assess the impact of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks on the change in 
willingness to take risk over time using variation in consumption as a proxy for shocks 
experienced. 
 
In order to obtain an objective proxy for shocks experienced, we estimate the consumption 
equation (1) in a first step (Table 4.2). All significant variables contain the expected signs 
(Günther and Harttgen 2009), however are not the core focus of this article. The model fits 
the data relatively well, because the proportion of variance that is modeled by the 
explanatory variables at the individual level is 0.796 (R²i) and 0.656 at the district level 
(R²j) for Thailand. The goodness-of-fit for the Vietnam model is lower than in the Thai 
sample, however with an explained variance in consumption at the individual level of 0.492 
(R²i) and of 0.109 at the district level (R²j) the values remain on par or higher than 
comparable studies (Günther and Harttgen 2009; Azam and Imai 2012).  
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Table 4.2 Multilevel mixed regression results of ln consumption per month 
 Thailand Vietnam 
Individual level   
Age  0.029*** 0.016** 
Age² -0.0002*** -0.0002** 
Education   
Secondary education (5-6 years) 0.14*** 0.068* 
Tertiary education (>7 years) 0.36** 0.183*** 
Employment   
Agricultural employment -0.003 -0.042 
Non-agricultural employment 0.026 0.019 
Self-employed 0.214*** 0.202*** 
Civil servant 0.141 0.318** 
Household size -0.096*** -0.097*** 
Dependency ratio -0.163*** -0.037 
Land size 0.017** 0.37*** 
Minority  -0.35*** 
Vietnam war  0.117*** 
District level   
Population -0.000002 0.0000002 
Enterprises 0.0005 0.001 
Location   
Mountain -0.007 0.26*** 
Water -0.143*** 0.202** 
Individual * district interaction   
Dependency ratio * Population 0.000002 -0.0000009** 
Land size * mountain 0.001 -0.361*** 
Land size * water 0.075*** -0.356*** 
Intercept 4.498*** 4.289*** 
σeij (individual level)  0.107 0.264 
R²i 0.796 0.492 
Ni  1254 1082 
σuj (district level) 0.052 0.163 
R²j 0.656 0.109 
Nj 45 31 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln consumption in $PPP per capita. Single, double, and triple asterisks 
(*,**,***) denote p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Source: DFG 756 Survey 2008 and 2010; own calculations 
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Based on the estimation of consumption, we can identify the idiosyncratic variance (
2ˆ
ije
 ) 
and covariate variance (
2
0
ˆ
ju
 ) of consumption (Table 4.3). We observe that the idiosyncratic 
and covariate variance is larger in Thailand than compared to Vietnam. In addition, the 
idiosyncratic variance is larger than the covariate variance in both countries, which is 
consistent with findings from Madagascar (Günther and Harttgen 2009) or Bangladesh 
(Azam and Imai 2012).  
 
Table 4.3 Estimated mean and variance of ln consumption per month ($PPP per capita) 
 Thailand Vietnam 
 2008 2010 2008 2010 
Mean ln consumption per month     
Observed 4.673 5.087 4.397 4.385 
Estimated 4.913 4.937 4.455 4.488 
Variance ln consumption per month 
(estimated) 
    
Idiosyncratic variance 0.193 0.191 0.148 0.15 
Covariate variance 0.055 0.055 0.031 0.031 
Total variance 0.246 0.248 0.178 0.178 
Source: DFG 756 Survey 2008 and 2010; own calculations 
 
In the second step, the estimated idiosyncratic variance in consumption serves as our proxy 
for idiosyncratic shocks, while the estimated covariate variance serves as our proxy for 
covariate shocks. These two proxies are used as explanatory variables to explain changes in 
willingness to take risk over time. We report standardized regression coefficients in Table 
4.4 in order to compare the relative magnitude of coefficients.  
 
In contrast to our expectations derived from the literature (Doss et al. 2008; Callen et al. 
2014; Cassar et al. 2011), in Thailand we find that the impact of idiosyncratic shocks at the 
individual level is negative and significant. An increase in idiosyncratic variance by one 
standard deviation is associated with a decrease in willingness to take risk by 
approximately 0.05 standard deviation units. Consistent with our expectations derived from 
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the literature (Hanaoka et al. 2014), health and present well-being significantly affect 
willingness to take risk. Healthy respondents are more willing to take risk than respondents, 
who report some health constraints but are generally not restricted in their daily activities. 
Improvements in present well-being are also associated with an increase in willingness to 
take risk. At the district level, however, the effect of covariate shocks on the willingness to 
take risk is not significant in Thailand.  
 
In Vietnam we obtain the expected result, where covariate shocks are significant and 
idiosyncratic shocks are not significant. An increase in variation in consumption at the 
district level by one standard deviation decreases the district average willingness to take 
risk by 0.23 standard deviation units. That means the estimated covariate shock impact 
evaluated in terms of variation in district-level consumption is likely to alter risk attitudes 
over time.  
However, we also find other factors at the individual level that show a significant impact on 
willingness to take risk in Vietnam. Factors that increase security, such as marriage, or self-
confidence, such as height, are significantly positive and in line with expectations (Dohmen 
et al. 2011; Sahm 2012).  
 
One possible explanation for the country-specific difference that idiosyncratic shocks 
trigger changes in risk attitudes of respondents from Thailand, whereas risk attitudes of 
Vietnamese respondents are affected by covariate shocks is the difference in the political 
orientation. In the last ten years, the Vietnamese government has made extensive 
investments into social protection schemes that may mitigate and/or prevent large impacts 
from idiosyncratic shocks. For example, under the “Social Insurance Law” a mandatory 
social insurance scheme for workers was created, a health insurance scheme was introduced 
and different “National Target Programs” were launched aimed to provide basic social 
services to specific vulnerable groups e.g. orphans, older people or ethnic minorities 
(Bonnet et al. 2012; Cuong et al. 2014). In addition, informal support networks tend to be 
stronger in socialist and former socialist countries, reducing the impact of idiosyncratic 
shocks. Correspondingly, covariate shocks are significant in Vietnam, because the informal 
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network may be unable to cope (Cook, Kabeer, and Suwannarat 2003). Furthermore, at the 
time of the survey, the Vietnamese government just initiated public programs to manage 
covariate shocks (Trung 2015). 
 
In Thailand, the two major social protection schemes, i.e. the “Universal Coverage 
Scheme” that provides health care and the “500Baht Scheme for Older People” leaves the 
majority of farmers from rural Thailand uncovered and hence vulnerable to idiosyncratic 
shocks (Schmitt et al. 2013). Empirical evidence from other studies also question the 
effectiveness of social protection in Thailand (Amare et al. 2012). Consistently, the impact 
of covariate shocks on risk attitudes are less likely in Thailand, because affected 
households receive compensation from the Thai government through specific relief 
programs (Poaponsakorn, Meethom, and Pantakua 2015). 
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Table 4.4  Impact of variation in consumption on the change in willingness to take risk over 
time 
 Thailand Vietnam 
Individual level   
Estimated idiosyncratic variance -0.048** -0.028 
Female -0.013 0.009 
Married 0.028 0.073*** 
Height 0.023 0.064** 
Member of socio-pol. organization -0.028 0.039* 
Health status   
Can manage -0.073*** 0.033 
Sick -0.01 -0.033 
Present well-being   
Same as last year 0.025 0.053** 
Better than last year 0.056** 0.166*** 
Much better than last year 0.04* 0.037 
Time 0.08*** 0.133*** 
District level   
Estimated covariate variance -0.04 -0.233** 
Intercept 2.874*** 1.648*** 
σeij (individual level)  0.711 0.844 
R²i 0.249 0.353 
Ni  1253 1081 
σuj (district level) 0.275 0.677 
R²j 0.99 0.652 
Nj 45 31 
Notes: Dependent variable is willingness to take risk. Coefficients are standardized. Single, double, and triple 
asterisks (*,**,***) denote p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Source: DFG 756 Survey 2008 and 2010; own calculations 
 
 
Comparing the magnitude of idiosyncratic shocks on changes in respondents’ willingness 
to take risk in Thailand with the magnitude of the covariate shock in Vietnam, shows that 
the impact of covariate shocks is larger. This is consistent with the literature as 
idiosyncratic shocks are generally found to be insignificant, it is therefore reasonable for 
the magnitude of covariate shocks to be larger than idiosyncratic shocks (Doss et al. 2008; 
Cassar et al. 2011; Willinger et al. 2013). 
 
Finally we further investigate if the impact of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks on the 
change in willingness to take risk is different between poor and non-poor respondents. In 
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order to classify respondents as poor or non-poor, we use the respective national poverty 
lines in Thailand and Vietnam. Table 4.5 gives an overview of the poverty lines and the 
percentage of respondents that were classified as chronically poor, transient poor and non-
poor. 
The national consumption poverty line in Thailand is approximately US$115 (PPP$) per 
capita per month both in 2008 and in 2010. In Vietnam, the national poverty line is 
approximately US$73 (PPP$) per capita per month4.  
Separating the poverty status into the three groups shows that only a small percentage is 
permanently below the poverty line with only 1% below in Thailand and 5% below in 
Vietnam. The majority of respondents in both countries is transient poor and faced with a 
high variation in consumption that may pull them below the poverty line. However, we 
observe a decline in poverty in Thailand, as the percentage of non-poor respondents 
increases from approximately 22% to 47%.  
 
Table 4.5 Distribution of structural poor, transient poor and non-poor respondents 
 Thailand Vietnam 
 2008 2010 2008 2010 
National poverty line ($ PPP per 
month per capita) 
115.12 115.865 72.48 72.48 
Chronically poor 0.005 0.003 0.037 0.028 
Transient poor 0.893 0.878 0.702 0.667 
Non-poor 0.224 0.466 0.385 0.394 
Source: (Thailand 2013; Vietnam 2012); DFG 756 Survey 2008 and 2010; own calculations 
 
 
                                                          
4
 We apply 4,800,000 VD in 2008 and 2010 as the national poverty line in Vietnam and 1,978 THB in 2,008 
and 2099 in THB 2010 as the national poverty lines in Thailand (Vietnam 2012; Thailand 2013). 
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As the number of respondents classified as structurally poor is too small, we use only 
transient poor respondents and non-poor respondents as two sub-samples to investigate 
differences in the impact of shocks on respondents’ willingness to take risk (Table 4.6).  
In separating the respondents into transient poor and non-poor we find no major changes 
between the impacts of shocks on changes in willingness to take risks, neither in Thailand 
nor in Vietnam. For the transient poor and non-poor, idiosyncratic shocks have a significant 
negative impact on changes in willingness to take risk in Thailand whilst covariate shocks 
remain insignificant. In Vietnam, for both groups covariate shocks show a significant 
negative impact, whereas idiosyncratic shocks stay insignificant. 
However, the consequences of covariate shocks on changes in willingness to take risks in 
Vietnam are different for the transient poor and non-poor. We see that the magnitude of the 
impact of covariate shocks on transient poor individuals is greater than on non-poor. 
Overall we see that the magnitude and impact of shocks on changes in willingness to take 
risks has a far more negative effect on the transient poor than the non-poor. This negative 
effect also carries further consequences for transient poor households, as through their 
increased risk aversion, they are more likely to make decisions that keep them further 
embedded in poverty (Mosley and Verschoor 2005). 
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Table 4.6 Impact of variation in consumption on the change in willingness to take risk over time for poor and non-poor respondents 
 Thailand Vietnam 
 Transient poor Non-poor Transient poor Non-poor 
Individual level     
Estimated idiosyncratic variance -0.02** -0.08** -0.026 0.05 
Female -0.014 0.008 0.0002 0.006 
Married 0.034 0.016 0.064**
 
0.041 
Height 0.014 0.057 0.077*** 0.028 
Member of socio-pol. organization -0.047 -0.009 0.032 0.057 
Health status     
Can manage -0.056*** -0.084** 0.024 -0.035 
Sick 0.004 -0.068* -0.009 -0.069 
Present well-being     
Same as last year 0.034 0.03 0.013 0.046 
Better than last year 0.06** -0.007 0.134*** 0.123*** 
Much better than last year 0.05* 0.034 0.036 0.003 
Time 0.071*** -0.006 0.125** 0.171*** 
District level     
Estimated covariate variance -0.032 -0.052 -0.235*** -0.153** 
Intercept 2.893*** 2.589 -2.061 0.068 
σeij (individual level)  0.647 0.967 0.575 0.354 
R²i 0.119 0.156 0.254 0.233 
Ni  1166 578 835 512 
σuj (district level) 9.97e^06 0.511 1.145 1.21 
R²j 0.99 0.459 0.267 0.211 
Nj 45 45 31 31 
Notes: Dependent variable is willingness to take risk. Coefficients are standardized. Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively. 
Source: DFG 756 Survey 2008 and 2010; own calculations 
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This result is, however, sensitive to the chosen poverty line. Therefore, we run the same 
multilevel regression model for different consumption thresholds which we commonly apply to 
Thailand and Vietnam (Table 4.7). In both countries, idiosyncratic and covariate shocks affect the 
willingness to take risk of the transient poor as the threshold increases. In Vietnam we observe 
this pattern from the US$4 (PPP$) threshold and in Thailand from the US$5 (PPP$) threshold on 
ward. Possibly, transient poor that are pushed in and out of poverty are more likely to be affected 
by idiosyncratic and covariate shocks, because correlated variations in consumption reduce their 
ability to cope with shocks.  
 
We also observe that transient poor are distinctively different from chronically poor in Vietnam. 
Across all poverty thresholds, the willingness to take risk of the chronically poor is only affected 
by covariate shocks. At the US$4 threshold, not only covariate shocks decrease the willingness to 
take risk of transient poor, but also idiosyncratic shocks. Probably respondents in permanent 
poverty have lower consumption variation than transient poor and find other coping strategies to 
buffer idiosyncratic shocks e.g. by means of individual risk-sharing arrangements or safety nets 
(Dercon 2002; De Weerdt 2005; De Weerdt and Dercon 2006). However, these mutual insurance 
mechanisms across individuals seem to perform worse for wealthier respondents in Vietnam. 
 
The results for Thailand suggest that such mutual insurance may not be existent, because 
idiosyncratic shocks significantly affect transient poor respondents’ willingness to take risk 
across all thresholds. In addition, the willingness to take risk of the transient poor at a higher 
threshold is also significantly altered by covariate shocks. This observation indicates that shocks 
that are correlated across individuals are likely to influence wealthier respondents in Thailand.  
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Table 4.7 Sensitivity analysis with different consumption thresholds (in US$ PPP per capita per day) 
Consumption threshold 
Thailand Vietnam 
Chronically 
poor 
Transient 
poor 
Non-poor 
Chronically 
poor 
Transient 
poor 
Non-poor 
US$2.5 PPP  Ni = 517 Ni = 914  Ni = 869 Ni = 300 
Est. idio. variance 
N.a. 
-0.049 -0.04 
N.a. 
-0.032 0.069 
Est. cov. variance 0.008 -0.065** -0.244*** -0.202*** 
       
US$3 PPP  Ni = 905 Ni = 525 Ni = 145 Ni = 913 Ni = 105 
Est. idio. variance 
N.a. 
-0.051** -0.01 -0.036 -0.031 0.036 
Est. cov. variance -0.001 -0.093** -0.126*** -0.269*** -0.138 
       
US$4 PPP  Ni = 1179 Ni = 111 Ni = 468 Ni = 725  
Est. idio. variance 
N.a. 
-0.043** -0.004 -0.043 -0.053** 
N.a. 
Est. cov. variance -0.041 -0.088 -0.142* -0.321*** 
       
US$5 PPP  Ni = 1204  Ni = 818 Ni = 384  
Est. idio. variance 
N.a. 
-0.046** 
N.a. 
-0.015 -0.076*  
Est. cov. variance -0.048* -0.17** -0.266*** N.a. 
       
US$6 PPP  Ni = 1105  Ni = 964 Ni = 185  
Est. idio. variance 
N.a. 
-0.064*** 
N.a. 
-0.008 -0.128** 
N.a. 
Est. cov. variance -0.053** -0.197** -0.208** 
Notes: Dependent variable is willingness to take risk. Each model controls for the same covariates as in Tables 4.4 and 4.6. Coefficients are standardized. Single, 
double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. N.a. means coefficients are not available because of small sample size. 
Source: DFG 756 Survey 2008 and 2010; own calculations 
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4.6 Summary and conclusions 
Large-scale shocks like a war (Callen et al. 2014), a tsunami (Cassar et al. 2011) or a 
volcano outbreak (Willinger et al. 2013) can trigger substantial changes in people’s risk 
attitudes. In contrast, idiosyncratic shocks like unemployment or illness seem not be 
related to individual risk attitudes (Doss et al. 2008).  
 
In this paper we aimed to examine the impact of large-scale and idiosyncratic shocks on 
changes in individual risk behavior over time using variation in consumption as an 
exogenous measure of the impact of shocks experienced. In addition, we investigated if 
the impact of shocks on changes in risk attitudes is different between poor and non-poor 
respondents. 
 
We found that risk attitudes significantly change over time, i.e. on average respondents 
appeared to become more willing to take risk both in Thailand and Vietnam. 
Furthermore, we found that idiosyncratic shocks affect risk attitudes of respondents in 
Thailand, whereas covariate shocks altered risk attitudes of respondents in Vietnam. 
The result appears plausible considering the differences in social policies.  
Investigating the impact of shocks for poor and non-poor respondents separately 
showed that the magnitude of covariate shocks is larger for the poor than for the non-
poor in Vietnam. We also investigated the impact of shocks across different 
consumption thresholds. We found that only covariate shocks affect the willingness to 
take risk of chronically poor, whereas idiosyncratic and covariate shocks matter for 
transient poor at a higher consumption threshold in Vietnam. In Thailand, the 
willingness to take risk of transient poor is affected by idiosyncratic shocks across all 
thresholds. At a higher threshold also covariate shocks matter. One possible explanation 
is that transient poor respondents that move in and out of poverty have lower abilities 
for shock prevention and mitigation and perceive the shock impact larger which in turn 
leads to increasing risk aversion. Consequently, transient poor respondents whose risk 
attitudes are affected by both kinds of shocks may be more likely to remain poor 
(Mosley and Verschoor 2005).  
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The results may also indicate that the chronically poor in Vietnam perform better in 
insuring idiosyncratic shock impacts than wealthier respondents. Possible insurance 
mechanism may include individual risk-sharing or safety nets across poor individuals 
that support each other in case of idiosyncratic shocks (Dercon 2002; De Weerdt 2005; 
De Weerdt and Dercon 2006). 
For Thailand, the results suggest that such mutual insurance mechanisms to cope with 
idiosyncratic shocks are not working well. The finding may point to a possible lack of 
social cohesion and may indicate a division of the Thai society. 
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